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The signature on 25 June 1988 in Luxembourg of the EEC-
CMEA (1) Joint Declaration, of which a text is annexed to this article, 
marked the establishment of official relations between the European 
Community and the CM,EA and at th~ same time gave the impetus 
for the normalization of bilateral relations between th~ Community 
and the individual East European countries members of the CMEA. 
As Mr. Genscher, German Foreign Minister and then Chairman 
of the EC Council, pointed out in his speech on the occasion of the 
signature, it turned a new page in the history of Europe since 1945. 
(1) ,MEA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also called COMECON. 
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The history of Community relations with Eastern Europe 
For many years after the creation of the Community, the Eastern· 
European countries, and particularly the USSR, had adopted a hostile 
attitude to it, regarding it,. according to their statements, as the e'Co-
nomic arm of NATO. For its part, the European Community 
had long been ready to normalize relations with its Eastern neighbours. 
Various initiatives in · this sense were taken in the Sixties, and in 
1972 the Heads of State and Government of the Community ex-
pressed their willingness to establish trade relations with Eastern 
Europe as a contribution to detente(2). In November 1974, the EC 
Commission proposed to all State-trading countries the outline of an 
overall trade agreement. The East European countries, however, at 
the time ignored this initiative. Their reaction was to propose in 
1976, a draft agreement to be concluded between the Community and 
the CMEA. as well as the member countries on both sides. The in-
clusion of the Member States was evidence of the CMEA's wish to 
ignore and hy-pass the Community's exclusive powers over trade policy 
matters, and to compel the EC to conduct its trade relations not 
directly with individual CMEA countries, but in a multilateral fra-
mework in which the CMEA would play the role of a kind of inter-
mediary - this despite the fact that the CMEA has no common 
commercial policy towards Western countries, and no trade agreements, 
as an organization, with the important Western trade partners of the 
CMEA such as Austria, Japan or the United States. The CMEA 
agreement with Finland of 1973 was only an apparent exception, con-
cluded for political reasons to off set Finland's agreement with the 
EEC of the same year. At this period there was clear evidence of an 
East European wish not to recognize the Community's identity as it 
was, hut to try to change it (3). 
The draft agreement, then, not only contained provisions for re-
lations between the two organizations, indicating various fields in which 
they might cooperate, b~t also laid down principles for the development 
of trade relations between the Community and the individual CMEA 
member countries: such principles as most-favoured nation treatment, 
the removal of obstacles to trade, non-discrimination, and the granting 
by the Community of generalized p.references to CMEA countries which 
were cc at an appropriate level of development ». According to this 
draft, bilateral agreements between tl}e Community and CMEA mem-
ber countries (as between EC Member States and the CMEA) would 
' only be used for the solution of cc certain particular C(\llcrete questions » 
and the Joint Committee, as proposed by the 1976 draft, would have 
the right to « contribute to the solution » of these questions. The 
Community saw this draft agreement as inten·ded to play down the 
significance of bilateral relations between the Communit~nd in-
(2) KLAUS SCHNEIDER, Einige A,pekte der zukunftigen Bmekun,en der Eu-
ropii.ischen Gemeimcha/t mit Osteuropa, in « Perspektiven fiir Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa»; H.D. JACOBSEN. H. MACHOWSKI. D. SAGER, ed.9. 
SchrufenreTiie der Bundeszemrale fiir Polrtische Bildung, Bonn (appears in Novem-
ber 1988). 
(3) SCHNEIDER, op. cit., section 5. 
dividual East European countries, to lay ~~wn guidelines for these 
relations in a « bloc-to-bloc » agreement, and to submit the bilateral 
agreements to the control of a << bloc-to-bloc» body, the EEC-CMEA 
Joint Committee. This approach was unwelcome lo the Community 
- and not entirely welcome, it appeared, to some of the East Eu-
ropean countries themselves; it was largely for this reason that the 
negotiations on an agreement between the two organizations, which 
had been going on since 1977, were finally suspended in 1980 and 
never resumed. It is often suggested that the suspension of nego-
tiations was a political ,gesture by the ·Community in reaction to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979; in fact this was 
not the _ case, although the worsening in the general climate of East-
W est relations which followed the invasion certainly did not encourage 
the Community to pursue vigorously its negotiations with the CMEA 
at that particular time. 
Meanwhile, since it had not proved possible to replace the bilateral 
. ' 
trade agreements between EC Member States and East European count-
ries, which expired at the end of 1974, by agreements negotiated with 
these countries at Community level, the EEC decided with effect from 
the beginning of 197 5 . to introduce a Community systelll of « autonom-
ous import arrangements » - basically a system of quantitative res-
trictions and quota opening taken over from the previous agreements 
of Member States. Another effect of the expiry of EC Member States' 
trade agreements and the unwillingness of the East European countries 
to replace , them with agreements =with tpe Community was the con-
. clusion, beginning in the early seventies, of a network of. cooperation 
agreements between most of the EC Member States and t~e CMEf 
countries. These are basic;Hy framework agreements on the encou-
ragement of industrial, . scien_tifi~ and technical cooperation between 
firms in the Member Statet in question and enterprises in the Eastern 
country. They do not contain references to · classical trade policy 
instruments, but they are certainly aimed at commercial _policy ob-
jectives, particularly the development and diversification of bilateral 
trade. 
Despite the policy line laid down by the USSR of avoiding direct 
dealings with the Community, and despite the sprouting o~ a crop of 
cooperation agreements-with MemiJel'.-states, most-of the East European 
countriM (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Ro~a) 
nevertheless found it useful in the middle to late seventies to conclude 
agreements with the EC as such in particular trade sectors: first tex-
tile1, on the basis of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement linked with the 
GA TT; then steel, in the framework of the cc Davignon Plan »; and 
finally sheep- and goatmeat. The conclusion of sectoral agreements 
was in the interests of these countries, maintaining and even guarantee-
ing access to the Community _market for their exports in these sectors. 
It was also, apparently, consistent with the overall line agreed within 
the CMEA whereby member countries were allowed agreements with 
the Community on"<< concrete questions ». Even when Romania con-
cluded a much broader agreement with the EEC in 1980, covering 
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trade in all industrial products, it was. intended to be regarded officiaUy 
as a sectoral agreement of the same kind; this was the reason why the 
Romanians insisted that the agreement on the creation of a Com-
munity-Romania Joint Commission, which was negotiated and con-
cluded simultaneously with the industr.ial products agreement, should 
be kept separate from it ( 4 ). 
If the first period of relations between the Community and the 
Eastern European countries was one of hostility, and if the second was 
one of limited contacts with stress on the CMEA as intermediary, the 
first signs of a more open and flexible attitude to the EC came in · 
1983-84. There were approaches by both Hungary and Czechoslova-
kia seeking wider trade links than the sectoral agreements they already 
had; and the CMEA began to send signals that it was time to take 
up again the dialogue suspended in 1980. But a recognition of the 
true nature of the Community as an economic and political entity had 
to await the imprimatur of Mr Gorbachev given when on 20 May 1985, 
during a visit to Moscow of Prime Minister Craxi, at that_ time Pr.e-
sident of the EC Council, the Soviet leade1' said it was time <c to 
organize mutually advantageous relations between•the CMEA and the 
EC in economic matters. To the extent that EEC countries act as a 
"political entity" we are ready to seek a com~on language with it, too, 
over international problems» (5). Less than a month later, on 14 
June, a letter from the Secretary of the CMEA, Mr Sychev, was handed 
to President Delors. It proposed that official relations should be estab-
. '-
lished between the CMEA and the EEC, no longer by the conclusion 
of a full-scale agreement, but by the adoption of a Joint Declaration. 
With his subsequent letter dated 26 September, Mr Sychev sent a 
CMEA draft of this declaration. 
Neatly three years were -to g~ hy before the declarati<>n courd be 
signed. This may appear surprising in view of the br~vity of the text, 
which in substance simply announces the establishment of official 
relations ·between the EEC and the CMEA and provides for subsequent 
contacts to work out possible areas and forms of coopt:ratiion between 
them. But two aspects unconnected with this substance led to intensive 
negotiations and discussions during the period 1985 to 1988. The first 
was the question, on the Community side, of how to respond to Mr 
Sychev's initiative. On the one hand, ft seemed unreasonable to reject 
it, given that the two organizations /had been in negotiation on an 
agreement from 1977 to 1980, and that the new CMEA draft was 
very much closer to Community thinking than any Eastern draft 
produced during that period. On the other hand, to react simply and 
exclusively to the CMEA initiative would contradict the Community's 
long-standing policy of giving prjority to relations with the individual 
East European countries, taking account of each country's particular 
econ\,.nic, legal and political situation, and of regarding relations with 
the CMEA as of secondary importance. This dilemma was overcome 
(4) On bilateral relations -het~een the Community and CMEA countries up 
to 1983, see JoHN MASLEN, The European Community's Relatioru with the State· 
trading Countries J.981-1983, Yearbook of European Law (1983), pp. 330-332. 
(5) For a history of CMEA-EC relations from the beginning to 1986, see 
JoHN MASLEN, The European Community's Relatioru with the State-tradins Count-
ries of Europe 1984-1986, Yearbook of European Law (1986), pp. 335-344. 
by addressing letters, in January-February 1986; to both Mr ·Sychev and 
the Foreign Ministers of the European CMEA countries. The letter 
to Mr Sychev acgepted his. proposal of establishing official EEC-CMEA 
relations and proJ>Osed an expert-level meeting to .discuss wayii and 
means of doing this; · at ' the same time, it stressed that it wQuld be 
inconsistent to have offi.c\al relations between .the EC and the CMEA 
~n the absence of such relations between the Community-and the-CMEA 
member countries. in his letter to the Foreign Ministers, Mr De 
Clercq, ,Commissioner· responsible for external relations, · referred to 
.Mr Sychev's approach, asked for each Minister's views on the possi-
bility of normalizing relations be.tween his country and the Com• 
munity, and recalled the EEC's willingness, expressed in its off er of 
197 4, to conclude overall trade agreements with each of the State-
trading countries. 
The reactions of the East European countries to the Community's 
« parallel aP,proach », i.e. seeking to develop relations with the CMEA 
member countries simultaneously with relations with the CMEA itself, 
were positive. The replies of the Ministers and of Mr Sychev, received 
in March-May 1986, . all expressed the wish to see official relations 
established between the CMEA and the EEC; the wish to normalize 
and develop, in parallel, the CMEA countries' bilateral relations with 
the Community; and willingness to discuss bilateral agreements with 
the Community. Accordingly, a series of contacts and discussions 
were held during 1986 to get going the process of normalization of 
relations both bilaterally and with the CMEA. J.n June 1986, the 
EC Commission submitted to the Council draft mandates for an agree-
ment on trade and industrial products with Czechoslovakia and a 
cooperation agreement with Romania, and these were approved in 
November and December respectively. Informal contacts took place 
with Hungary in June and July over a trade and cooperation agree-
ment, draft Directives for which were finally proposed to the Council 
in December. The first exploratory discussions with Poland were 
held in July with a second round in November, while first contacts 
with Bulgaria took place iii October, with the GDR in November, and 
with the Soviet Union in January 19 8 7. The first meeting between 
experts of tl1e Commission and of the CMEA Secretariat to discuss the 
new draft declaration took place on 22-24 September 1986. Consider-
~ble · progress towards the 1EC's goaf of developing relations "in pa· 
rallel" was therefore visible during 1986. 
The second question which compiicated the negotiation of the 
Joint Declaration was that of the geographical area' of its application. 
Community · agreements with non-EC countries always• ~~ntain a ter-
riJorial application clause. It lays down that, as far as the Community 
is concerned, the agreement shall apply to the territories in which the 
Treaty establishing the EEC' is applied, and under the conditio~ laid 
down in that Treaty. This refers t,o many territories and areas, su~h as 
the French Departements et Territoires d'Ou·t~Mer, for which special 
provisions are made in the Treaty of· Rome or in annexes to it. But 
what --particularly concerns East European countries are the provisions 
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on the application of the Treaty to Berlin (West), i.e. the Declaration 
on Berlin ( 6 ). Any agreements containing the territorial clause there-
fore imply the inclusion of West Berlin in the Community. In earlier 
years the approach by the Soviet Union - though not applied entirely 
consistently - was to deny that West Berlin formed part of the Com-
munity, and to protest when the EC undertook activities or set up 
institutions in that city (7). This had earlier ,prevented or hampered 
the conclusion of a number of agreements between East European 
countries and the Community, and notably the fisheries agreement 
between the EEC and the USSR which was negotiated in 1977, but 
never concluded because of the territorial clause problem. A com-
promise solution to this problem was found in 1978, during the ne-
gotiation of the first textile agreement between the Community and 
Hungary. When this was concluded, the territorial application clause 
was included in it, but a umlateral declaratjon was made by the Hun-
garian side at the time of initiaHing and signing the agreement. It 
~aid that the agreement dc,es not affect "the well-known quadripartite 
agreements and in particular the agreement of 3 September 1971", i.e. 
•the four-power agreement on the status of Berlin. The same solution 
was employed subsequently on the conclusion of textile and sheep-
meat agreements with other East European countries. However, the 
CMEA side in the negotiations over the Joint Declaration ref.used for 
a long time to accept either the inclusion of a territorial application 
clause - on the grounds that the provisions of the declaration were 
general rather than speci•fic and that the declaration had no time limit 
- or the compromise solution used in the sectoral agreements with 
CMEA member countries. Finally, when it beoame clear that for the 
Commission and the Member ~ates the territorial clause was a sine qua 
non for the signing of the.Jo{~fDedaration, the CMEA side ac~p~ed 
it, at the last negotiating meeting on 17 -19 May 1988, on condition 
that a unilateral declaration on the line of the « Hungarian formuJa » 
could be made by them at ~e time of conclusion. 
The present situation and future prospects 
The significance of the Joint Declaration, then, lies less in its 
content than in its existence, which symbolises the normalization of 
East European relations with the Community, opens the way for 
diplomatic relations and the conclusion of bilateral trade or trade and 
cooperation agreem,ents between the EC and individual CMEA member 
countries, and represents recognition of the Community's identity both 
in terms of its territory and of its competences. The Joint Declaration 
( 6) Declaration by the Government of the FRG on the application of t1Ae 
Treaties to Beidin: anne:x to the Fmal Act vl the Treaty eatahliahing the EEC: iD 
« Treaties establishing -ihe ~~ Ln:xembomc; 1973, p. -5M. 
(7) Rii-.GER HiiTTs, Berlin and alw European Communilio, Yearbook ol Eu-
ropean Law (1983), 1-23. 
clearly limits EC-CMEA cooperation to areas where both partners have 
powers and where they have a common interest. The EC's powers are 
wider than those of the CMEA as an organization; and the new willing-
ness of CMEA countries, and notably the Soviet Union, to negotiate 
with the Community on trade and a wide range of other areas of 
cooperation recognizes this. The Community had long insisted on its 
wish to negotiate with the individual CMEA countries alone, since it 
is these countries and not the CMEA which in practice control the 
instruments of trade · policy - tariffs, quotas, but above a11 foreign 
trade plans and directives and the distribution of hard currency -
and are thus in a position to negotiate with the ,Community on a basis 
of effective reciprocity. A long-standing dispute over the Community's. 
exclusive power to negotiate on trade matters with the East European 
countries has thus been resolved in favour of the EC. 
The fundamental change in the attitude of the Soviet Union and 
its allies to the Community has b~en expressed both in actions and in 
words. In contrast to the highly critical evaluation of ·western Euro-
pean integration which East European commentators made in the 60s 
and 70s, a more realistic and balanc~d tone has been heard in recent 
years. Nevertheless, some Eastern spokesmen still ~n~ it difficult to 
believe that the Community is not directed against anyone; East Euro-
pean propaganda about the "antisocialist trend" of the EC can still be 
heard, especially from sources in the GDR. However, they are becom-
ing ~apidly less typical of the general attitude towards the Community 
in Eastern Europe. 
For many years the Community has been pointing out the anomal-
ous nature of a situation in which the great majority of countries in the 
world - some 130 at the latest count - had established diplomatic 
relation~ with the EC while a number of important European countries, 
close neighbours of the Community, had not. There was growing evid-
ence in recent years that the East European countries themselves 
recognized this anomaly, and that they were looking forward to having 
formal relations, while at the same time calculating whether some 
advantage could he gained from doing so. 
In the letters sent by the Foreign Ministers of the CMEA count-
ries in 1986,. some of them, notably the Soviet Union aruLthe GDR, 
made a clear link between the establishment of official relations he-
-tween the ECC and the CMEA and their own acrreditation of d,ip-
lomatic missions to the Community. Other countries, such as Ro-
mania, ·made no link with the CMEA, but seemed rather to wish to 
bargain diplol'Ilatic relations against the conclusion of agreements 
with the Community on a basis satisfactory to them. The first im-
mediate result' of the initialling in Mos~ow of the .Joint Declaration_ 
on 9 June 1988, following the settling of 'the territorial clause problem, 
was the announcement, through Notes from several East European 
-governments, of their decision to accredit missions· to the Community. 
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The Soviet Union and_ the GDR presented their Notes , on the day of 
the initialling, Bulgaria ad Czechoslovakia on 13 June; Hu~gary fol-
lowed suit at the time of the initialling of its agreement with the 
Community on 30 June, and Poland at the end of July. Consent . 
from both the Council and the Commission to the establishment of 
these missions was given on 10 August,. for- t~e first five countries, 
and on 16 September for Poland. With this exchange of Notes 
diplomatic relations may be said to exist, even if the accreditation 
of Ambassadors and the setpng up of missions . will take some tim; 
longer. It is rematkabl~ tpat Romania, which was the first CMEA 
country to enter into officia~ dealings with the Community in the E!arly 
seventies, and the first to conclude an agreement with it a few years 
later, has still not proposed the opening of a diplomatic mission. This 
is all the more surprising as some non-European CMEA countries -
Cuba and Vietnam - have done so, although the Vietnamese request 
has not yet been accepted by the EC Council. In practice, the absence 
of a mission means . little. Business ·can be done, as it has for years, 
between the Community and, for example, the . Romanian Embassy to 
Belgiumft The establishment of diplomatic relations is above · aH a 
goodwill gesture. which the Romanian authorities are at present un-
willing to make, either because of the strained political relations be-
tween Romania and the West, or because they ' hope in this way to 
put pressure on the Community to make concessions to them over a 
trade agreement. 
The new approach towards the Community adopted by the East 
European nations. · and marked by the setting up of official relations, 
must be seen against the wider background of the improvement in 
recent years of East-West relations as a whole. The West has adopted 
a cautiously positive attitude to the reform process in Eastern Europe, 
regarding it as a necessary movement if progress is to be made towards 
solving the serious economic problems of the region, even if at present 
the practical effects of perestroika are less impressive than its theoretical 
scope. The increased transparency in the -economic system of most 
East European countries, and the moves towards greater openness in 
social and ipolitical matters which have been linked with it, were 
specifically welcomed by the Hanover European Council of 27-28 June 
1988. The Member States and the Community itself have made 
known their interest in developing deeper and broader political, eco-
nomic and culturai 'relations with the East, both for their own sake 
and in the hope of encouraging structural change there. On their 
side, the USSR and oth~r East European countries havP become well 
aware of the need for -improvements in the structure of their trade 
with the ·West, involving an increase in the share of industrial products 
among their exports. To achieve. this aim, they need a radical im-
provement in the quality of the products they can offer for export, 
which in turn necessitates closer lin~s with Western firms and their 
knowhow, not only in technology and production methods, but in 
management and marketing. Traditionally, Soviet ~ports have been 
(2) 
mainly of raw material and fuels; those of Eastern Europe, apart from 
:agriculture, ha\ve tended to concentrate on semi-manufactures and 
relatively unso}lliisticated consumer goods - sectors in which they 
enter into direct competition with the NICs. Attempts in the- l~Os 
to retool East European industry on the basis of loans from the West 
were for the most part unsuccessful, and led to the build-up of a 
heavy burden ()f indebtedness reckoned at some $ 100 billion net at 
the end of 1987. One method, tried since the mid-seventies, to over-
come Eastern Europe's twin problems of indebtedness and uncompe-
titive exports has been the use of compensation transactions ( counter-
trade ); but there is a wide realization nowadays that, while this form 
of deal may allow trade ·to take place which would otherwise he im-
possible, it is not a long-term solution because in practice it amounts 
to entrusting Western firms with the task of marketing East European 
products. An alternative solution which has long been recommended 
by Western businessmen and economists, and which several Ea5t Eu-
ropean countries have now enthusiastically adopted, is the particularly 
intensive form of industrial cooperation which involves direct invest-
.ment - in other words joint ventures. 
Another East European objective which has as its logical co-
rollary more intensive cooperation with the Community ·is the wish 
to become more involved in the world trading system; for example, 
several East European countries became members of GATT around 
197 0; Bulgaria has now officially applied for memhershjp .and the 
Soviet Union has hinted at its interest in becoming a Contracting 
Party at a later stage. It is also important for Eastern Europe to 
maintain and develop access to the Community market in anticipation 
of the creation of the Single Market in 1992. 
There is no doubt, then, abou._ the interest for CMEA countries 
in developing economic relations with the Community. l:lowever, the 
potential for developing these relations is limited by a number of 
factors, ·some of which, such as the world economic environment, are 
largely outside the control of EC and CMEA countries. An~ther factor 
is the internal economic development of. the partner countries them-
selves, which is by definition within their control; if they do nol 
pursue sound economic poliicie~, even the most imaginative interna-
tional cooperation cannot cpmperisate in the long term (8). Fin~y, 
account must be taken of existing links between partners. _ Relations 
between East European countries members of GATT and the Com-
munity are based io a greater or lesser -extent on the rules of GATT, 
as amended by their Protocols of Accession to GATT when those exist. 
(8) EDMUND WELLENSTEIN, Hi.3toric~ ,upects and pon_ib~ future d~elopmenll 
in EC-Cornecon relatwn.s, paper contributed to. the Colloqwum on Legal .A.pecta of 
East-West Reiations, organized by the 1nlemauonal 1.aw D'ep~rtm~nl ot tht Unf. 
versity oft Warsaw and the European Institute of the Umver.uty of Utrecht, 
June 1988. 
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Some of these countries - Poland and Romania - undertook obliga-
tions in their Protocols which they have since been unable to fulfil. 
This experience, together with the recent Bulgarian request to become 
a Contra0ting Party to GATT, raises the underlying problem of how 
a State-trading system can be fitted into the pattern of GATT rules, 
devised as the latter were for relations between market economy 
countries. where. decisions about production, pricing. and purchasing 
are taken by autonomous entities and where the State limits itself to 
measures like customs duties, quotas. safety and health prescriptions 
and indirect taxation. GATT obligations are expressed in terms of 
these instruments. The Protocols of Accession are less than perfect 
solutions; and trade policies of market economy countries towards 
State-trading countries will tend to be interventionist because the price-
fixing mechanism in the latter is fundamentally different, and decisions 
a.bout buying and selling can be taken irrespective of competitive 
factors. Then there is the problem of the non-convertibility of · the 
currencies in Eastern Europe; this already imposes a pattern of bila-
teral equilibria on trade relations between the CMEA countries them-
selves, and between them and many of their partners in the develop· 
ing world - a less dynamic pattern than a multilateral system would 
allow for. None of the.sc limiting factors can be removed by trade 
or cooperation agreements as such. At best they can mitigate the 
problems by creating better flows of information and better understand-
ing. The real solution to the incompatibility of systems may be found 
in economic reform: only a closer approach to the market economy 
system within the CMEA countries themselves will allow a new 
dynamism to take the place · of stagnation. The conclusion of agree-
ments which go beyond traditional trade instrqments to cover the 
area of com~ercia,l and economic cooperation will »ecome more ef-
fective only insofar as the independence of action of Eastern enter-
prises increases with the decentralization of economic decision-making, 
since an important function of such agreements ·is the encouragement 
of cooperation between individual firms and enterprises. 
Similarly, the extent to which it will be possible in the long term 
to extend to Eastern Europe the network of specific agreements which 
the EC has with its West European neighbours, will very much depend 
on how far the process of modern,ization and reform in the East Eu-
ropean economies will be able to go. The idea of an EC-CMEA free 
trade area, put forward by some writers, would also for the foreseeable 
future come up against the problem of the differences between econ-
omic and trade policy systems. It is hard to see how such a free 
trade area _could be put into effect without a complete revamping of 
the Eastern economic system. The removal of customs barriers would 
not make trade in a State-trading country any more "free". Moreover, 
free trade can only take place between countries with freely convertible 
currencies (9). 
(9) SCHNEIDER, op. cit., section 4. 
ffespite rhese limiting factors, the process of negotiation between 
East European countries and the Community on trade and cooperation 
matters has become particularly intense over the past two years. In 
the present stage of East· West economic relations, classical non-prefer-
ential trade agreements may not always he enough to achieve an in-
crease in trade levels. Such ag~ements, fxemplified ,by the. EC-Ro-
mania industrial products agreement of 1980, have their uses: they 
can reduce restrictions on trade and provide, through the setting up 
of Joint Committees, an annual forum for discussing trade and economic 
problems of all kinds which may arise between the two parties. But 
to develop trade in the present economic situation needs both creativity 
and cooperation. The main provider of these essential elements, in 
the Western system, is to be found at the level of individual firms. 
Therefore it is in the interest both of the Community and of its 
Eastern trading partners to move beyond the traditional trade policy 
fields of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, safeguard clauses · etc. and 
by the negotiation of broad agreements covering commercial and in-
dustrial cooperation to seek tq ensure favourable conditions for the 
operation of Communily firms in Eastern Europe. In particular, bu-
sinessmen in Eastern countrids still often have -difficµ:f ty in entering 
into contact with the end users of their products. Working conditions 
for firms' offices and visiting representatives in Eastern Europe need 
to be improved, and the recruitment and employment of locally-en-
gaged staff made easier. Better access to economic information -
not only statistics of production, consumption and trade but broad 
planning figures and information on trade and economic regulations 
auu uu:: urg1muauuua1 se1·up of foreign trade organizations - can 
help facilitate commercial work for the Eastern country as well as 
for the Western businessman. The advantage of cooperation , agree-
ments. with the Community as such is that they can result in improved 
operating conditions for firms of all Member States, not just one of 
them. Such agreements are of particular value for small and medium-
sized firms, which have more difficulty than larger firms in dealing with 
the peculiar circumstances of trading with Eastern Europe. 
The most important landmark to date in the process of develop-
ing Community agreements with Eastern Europe is the agreement 
on trade and commercial and economic cooperation with Hungary, 
i.i.nitialled on 30 June and signed on 26 September 1988; the text 
is annexed to this ar.ticle. In the field of trade, this provides for the 
removal of Community quantitative restrictions (QRS), insofar as they 
are inconsistent with Article XIII of GATT (i.e. "discriminatory" 'or 
"specific" QRs). This removal will take place in three stages: the 
first , during the ·first year of the validity of the Agreement, will see 
the liberalization of ·non-sensitive products which have not been import-
ed from Hungary during the last three years; in the second stage, up 
to the end of 1992, restrictions will be removed on a large number 
of imports which ar~ not particularly sensitive; in many cases these 
have already been liberalized experimentally, or else the quotas allowed 
under the present « autonomous import arrangements » have not been 
fully ·used. Imports of sensitive products will he freed from restrictions 
II 
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during the third period from 1992-95: up to 1998 (the Agreement is 
a ten-year one) special safeguard measures will be in force to protect 
the particularly sensitive sectors of Community industry which might 
be affected by a rapid increase in imports o{ the products liberalized 
in the third stage. Besides agreeing to these safe~ard measures, Hun-
gary has also accepted, in the chapter on commercial cooperation, to 
give non-discriminatory treatment to Community firms in such mat-
ters as the ~ssue of licences. the administration of Hungary's global 
quota on oonsumer goods, the facHities provided for busilteSsmen who 
wish to set up representations or agencies in Hungary and the treat-
ment of trading partners in matters of intellectual property. The part of 
the agreement concerned with economic cooperation mentions such areas 
as industry, agriculture, science, transport, tourism, the environment 
and en.ergy: all those are areas where Commum•ty specialists who have 
studied the matter consider that there is an interest for the Community 
in cooperating with Hungary. The provisions on this cooperation 
do not enter into details on the exact fields to be covered or methods 
to be used: these will form the subject of bilateral discussions later, 
particufarly in the Joint Committee set up by the· agreement, which 
can discuss practically any economic subject which concerrui the two 
parties. . 
The agreement with Hungary, therefore, already shows a subs-
tantial section on economic cooperation, and as far as the trade aspect 
goes, it represents what is in effect the limit of the trading policy 
possibilities of the EEC vis-a-vis a State-trading country. In negotiat-
ing this agreement great attention was paid to the particular situation of 
Hungary: for example, its status -in GATT, where its Protocol of Acces-
sion of 1973 recognizes the economic valJdity of the Hungarian Tariff, 
and also provides for the removal of discriminatory quantit~tive restrict-
ions, in principle by 1975; then again, Hungary has gone further than 
other East European countries in certain aspects of its economic reform 
movement, e.g. in the banking and fiscal areas, which in turn have 
acted as an inspiration for reformers in the Soviet Union . and else-
where. This has attracted the interest and goodwill of the EC and 
its Member State Governments and has also improved th_e possibilities 
for cooperation with Hungary by Community firms. 
The Community has concluded many cooperation or trade-and-
cooperation ~greements with non-member countries over the yea'l'S. 
Legally, these raise the problem of h,ow far Community coopers· 
tion agreements are compatible with existing Member State ~ 
operation agreements and How far the complex of economic, indus-
trial and technical cooperl\tion may. be said. to fall ~ithi~ the tr~de 
policy competences of the Commumty. Without gomg !nto details, 
current practice points _to a "mixed" competence of both Co~munity 
and Member States. The problem .is dealt with in the agreement with 
Hungary on the basis of the formula originally worked out for the 
Community's cooperation agreement with Canada iJ?, 1976 (10). This 
, provides that the new agreement shall in no w~y affect the ,powers of 
· the Member States · to undertake ·bilateral economic cooperation aetiv-
(10) "official Journal of the European Communitiea L _260/76. 
ities with Hungary and to conclude new economic cooperation agree-
ments with her. Strictly speaking, this provision should be unneces-
sary: as is specified later in the Agreement, if provisions of existing 
agreemepts of Member States are incompatible with or identical with 
the Community agreement, the latter substitutes for them; while new 
Member State agreements can, if necessary, be challenged in the Eu-
·ropean Court on the grounds of incompatibility with the Treaty. 
Each bilateral negotiation or discussion with an East European 
country has its own characteristics and raises its own particular prob-
lems. The most advanced negotiation after that w,ith Hungary at 
the time of writing is that with Czechoslovakia; but this agreement 
will be considerably different from that with Hungary. For one thing, 
it will cover only industrial goods, its has no element of economic 
cooperation, and Jt is likely to be a relatively short-term agreement. 
The nub of its trade content is the granting of increased quotas for 
products of interest to Czechoslovak exporters. After negotiations 
lasting for just over a year, the last meeting was held in July 1988, 
and the next and perhaps final round is planned for October. 
Besides Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Commission has also 
reeeived from the Council in 1986 a mandate to negotiate an agree-
ment with Romania. . The agreement outlined in this mandate is, 
again, quite different from those previously described. As Romanja 
has already concluded, in 1980, an agreement on trade in industrial 
products, the new mandate provides for the existing agreement to be 
extended to cover agricultural products, and for a chapter on economic 
cooperation to be added, covering several of the fields mentioned in 
the Hungarian agreement. However, little progress has been made in 
negotiating the agreement with Romania, and this for vartous reasons: 
the Romani~n party wanted concessions from the €ommunity, parti-
cularly in the trade field, which the Commission negotiators were not 
empowered to give; and increasingly erratic Romanian economic po-
licies and political action in recent years - for ·example, the campaign 
of « systematization », or the destruction of rural villagei"and the 
concentration of the inhabitants in agro-indust:r.ial centres - have 
had a deleterious effect on relations with Romania's Western partners 
which make it difficult to contemplate improving the already relatively 
favourable treatment the Community gives to Romanian exports (Ro-
mania benefits from access to the EC's Generalized Scheme of Prefer-
ences). 
With the remaining European CMEA countries, th~ Community 
is still at the stage of exploratory conversations. These preliminary 
contacts are designed to enable the Commission to get an idea of the 
interests of the country involved and of the possible contents of a 
future agreement. On the basis of these discussions, which can la11t 
for weeks or years, the Commission seeks negotiating directives from 
the Council; once these -are agreed, the Commission can begin negotia-
tions proper: When the negotiations are successfully concluded, the 
Commission ini·tials the draft agreement and submits it to the Council 
which, ,if it is acceptable, concludes the agreement. Of the countries 
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which have begun exploratory contacts with the Commission, Poland 
and Bulgaria have advanced the farthest, having had £our rounds 
and three rounds of discussions respectiveiy since 1986. Both count-
:r,ies are interested in trade and. cooperation agreements _ with the 
EEC, and the Commission is art present ;at ~ork on drafting 
mandates for submission to the Council foi1 agreements with the-
se two countries. T_he German Democratic Republic held its 
first round of exploratory conversations on 27-28 September 1?88. It 
is interested in the first instance in· a pure trade agreement without 
a cooperation element. In this dialogue a particularly important 
element is the need to take account of the existing arrangements £or 
trade between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany, trade 
~hich, under . the Protocol on Inner-Ger~an Trade anne~ed · to the 
Treaty of Rome, is excluded from the .trade policy powers 0£ the 
Community (11). 
Last but not lea!t ,there , is the USSR, with which a second round 
of exploratory conversationst is planned towards the end of October 
1988. The Soviet Union has announced its interest in an .agreement 
going beyond the trade field and covering coopemtion in practically 
all areas of Community competence. Discussions on the content of 
an agreement between the EEC and the USSR will take place in 
October 1988. The Commission has to examine carefully in what 
areas, besides trade, cooperation between the EC and the USSR would 
be to the advantage of the Community. ·one such area could be the 
protection of the environment; a. good deal of cooperation with Eastern 
European countries already takes place under int.e:r,national conven-
tions in su.ch fields as air and water pollution, the protection of the 
marine environment etc. In the area of fisheries, following the first 
attempt at negotiating a Soviet-EEC agreement in 1977, there remains 
an interest on the part of the Community in arriving at an agreement 
which would give Community fishermen access to certain Soviet fish-
ing zones, for example in the Baltic. In energy policy, there is an 
obvious --interest on the Community side, following the Chernobyl 
accident, in cooperation in nuclear reactor safety, and this interest is 
shared by the Soviet authorities. There is already a quadripartite 
agreement between the Community, the United States, Japan and the 
Soviet Union on cooperation on research into nuclear fusion as a 
possible energy resource. Shipping policy in the Community and in the 
USSR is a matter of common interest, in particular because of the prob-
lems posed to Community shipowners by competition by Soviet lines on 
various oceanic freight routes. No doubt there are various areas of scien-
tific cooperation which can be identified as being of joint jnterest, alt-
hough ,in this area particularly the security interests of the Community 
and the need for Community firms to protect the confidentiality of their 
technological processes may set hounds to "the possibilities of cooperation. 
On the one hand, it is up to individual firms, as the actual creators 
and owners of advanced technology, to take the decisions on how 
£ar the purchase of their technologic~l knowhow in a particular project 
(U) ~tocol on German internal trede and related . problems in « Tzeati• 
eatabli.shing the European Communities», Luxembourg, 197_3, p. 431. 
is advantageous to them as well as to their Eastern partners. On the 
other hand, Western Governments are faced with the problem of dual-
use technology, which makes it more difficult than in the past to dis-
' tingu.ish "strategic" exports from those which are not~ The problem 
.of export cont~ols, at present exercised by the Member States after 
c~nsultations in the Paris-based COCOM framework, will come to 
the fore also in the context of the creation of the single European 
market by 1992. Application of the COCOM list inevitably...affects· 
trade, and the arguments are gr9wing for some sort of Community 
approach to this problem. 
To sum up, the possibilities of trade and economic cooperation 
between the Community and East European countries are wide-ranging, 
and the ag:eements which are being or will be concluded by the EC 
with those countries are likely to be of various types with varying 
mixes of trade and cooperation elements, depending on the interests 
of the country concerned. With the CMEA, too, the implementation 
of the provisions of the Joint Declaration on future cooperation will 
depend on a careful examination of the concrete possibilities of the 
two organizations. Community officials are not well informed about 
the activities of the CMEA, and the reverse is also no doubt true. A 
period of getting to know each other, of exchange of information, will 
be necessary ~fore fields for future cooperation can be identified. As 
a result of the first exploratory talks with the CMEA Secretariat, ~eld 
in February 1975, four possible areas of cooperation were identified 
and included in the draft agreement of 1976: environment, norms 
and standards, planning and forecasting, and economic information. 
But time has moved on , and even in these 11reas it _will be necessary 
to compare notes ·again and examine how tb'e activities and powers -of 
the two organizations have increased or changed since 1975. The 
composition of the CMEA, with its three non-Eu~opean _memhers (Cu-
ba, Mongolia and Vietnam), as well as its rules of operation, whereby 
major decisions have to be taken by consensus, and its relatively 
limited powers and resources as an entjty, may set limits to the· scope 
for direct working arrangements between the CMEA Secretariat and 
the Community. There is a further problem which must ' be home 
in mind when considering the prospects for what East-European count-
ries call <c pan-European cooperation » and· appear to define as co-
operation between the CMEA and the EC. There are a number , of 
countries in Europe \\;hich bel~ng to neither organization, and with 
many of which the C~mmunity has rather advanced relations of co-
operation. In such areas as f; ansport or environment, it is difficult 
to see how a rational system of1Europe-wide cooperation can be worke~ 
out while leaving aside, for example, Scandinavia, Austria, Switzerland 
or Yugoslavia. The conclusion would seem to be that real pan-Euro-
pean cooperation in many areas should rationally. be based upon the 
existing work of the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, a 
regional organ of the UN Economic and Social Council covering Eu-
rope and North America, in which both the Community and-· the 
CMEA are observers. A wide range of working groups in practically 
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all areas of economic cooperation exists already in the ECE frame-
work. This is not to play down the interest aud importance of co-
operation between the EC and the CMEA, but to indicate that exag-
gered hopes should not be pinned on such cooperation, which has its 
inevitable limits. 
Another important forum for multilateral discussion and negotia-
tion on economic c~peration is the process started in 197 5 on the 
conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) and the adoption of ,its Final Act. It is the second chapter, 
the so-called << Basket II » of the Final Act, which concerns especially 
trade and economic matters. The latest stage in the CSCE process 
is the Vienna Review Meeting, which began in 1986 and is likely to 
end in the autumn of 1988. In this forum the Community and its 
Member States have proposed a follow-up conference on East-West 
economic cooperation, to be held in the FRG. If this conference 
takes place, the role of the EC is likely to be an important one; in 
fact it is hard to see, bearing in mind the single market target date 
of 1992, h6w the conference can arrive at substantial conclusions 
without taking full account of the competences of the Community. 
The normalization of Community-East European relations and 
the new, more realistic and outward-looking approach of the USSR 
and its allies will undoubtedly mean -that, both for the Community 
and for the European Political Cooperation (EPC) of its Member 
States, East-West relations will play a more import•ant part than in 
the past. Community and EPC bodies will give more time and 
attention to relations with their ·East European neighbours. Insofar 
as the rejection by the EC's Eastern neighbours of outdated shibboleths 
leads to greater cooperation and interdependence in Europe, this process 
will be to the political and security advantage of Western Europe. At 
. . 
preseillt, in ac·cordance with the Single European Act which entered 
into force on 1 July 1987, cooperation in EPC on security matters is 
limited to political and economic aspects of security, and the function 
of cooperation in military aspects of security is reserved to the _lY.:estern 
European Union. The question remains whether this abstinence of 
the EPC in the decisive questio'n of security policy will survive the 
revision of the Single Act which is to take place in 1992. De~ite 
the failt.tre of President Delors' attempt to persuade the Eur~pean 
Council in March 1987 to take up the theme of nuclear disarmament 
,in answer" to the Soviet initiative, it is logical that a coherent "Ost-
·politik" of the European Community cannot be developed without 
a security policy element (12). 
il2) HoRST G . .Kn:NzLER, Stand und Perspektiven der Bmehun,en der EG 
m den Lii111Wn Osteuropas, speech made in Berlin on the occuion ol. the 15th 
anniversary of the European Community's Berlin Office, 21 October 1988. 
(3) 
ALLEGATO I 
Joint declaration on the establishment of official relations 
between the European Economic Community 
and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 
of the one part, and 
THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, 
of the other part, 
having regard to the acts establishing the European Economic Community and 
the CouncH for Mutual Economic Assist,ance, and ' in particular the T~aty of 
Rome, 
on the basis of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, and taking account o£ the results of the subsequent stages of the c.scE 
·process, 
denro'" of contributing, by the activities they pursue within their fi.el<ls ~f compel· 
ence, to the further development of international economic cooperation, an importam 
factor in economic growth and social progress, 
DECLARE AS FOLLOWS : 
l. The European Economic Capimunity and the Council for Mu~al Econo~c 
Assistance establish official relations with each other by adoptin,g this ~~laration. 
2. The Parties will de""ve1op cooperation in areas which fall. within their 
respective spheres of competence and where there is a com.mop. interest. . 
3. The areas, forms and methods of cooperation will be determined by_ the 
Parties by means of contacts and discUBSions between their representatives designated 
for this pw,pose. • 
4, On the basis of the experience gained in developing cooperation between 
them, the parties will, if necessary, examine the possibility of determining new 
areu, forms and methods of cooperation. 
5. As reg·ards the application of this Declaration to the Commu!1ity, it shall 
apply to the territories in which the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community is , applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty. 
6. This Declaration is drawn up in duplicate in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, 
Dutch, English , French, German, Greek., Hungarian, Italian, Mongolian, Polish, 
Portuguese, Romanian. Russian. Spanish and Vietnamese languages, each text 
being equally authentic. 
Done at Luxembourg, on the twenty-fifth day of June one thousand nine hundr-
ed and eighty-eight. 
* * * * * * 
Extracted from: RF: RI/57 
Rivista di studi politici internazionale. Firenze. No. 04 
Ottobre-Dicembre 1988. p. 557-586. all. 
* * * * * * 
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LA SIGNATURE, a Bruxelles le 25 juin 1988, de Ja Declaration conjointe sur l'etablissement des 
relations officielles entre Jes Communautes euro-
peennes et le Conseil pour !'assistance economi-
que mutuelle (COMECON), represente un eYene-
ment important clans le cadre du de,·eloppement 
des relations entre l'Ouest et l'Est. 
Cctte reconnaissance officielle de la CEE et 
du COillECON om-re Jes perspect\'ies d'une plus 
large cooperation economique et politique entre 
l'Ouest et !'Est. 
La Declaration conJomte pn!,·oit que les 
deux parties deYelopperaient leur cooperation clans 
Jes secteurs presentant un interet commun. Les 
modalites et Jes methodes de cooperation seront 
dcfinies moyennan t Jes con tac.ts et Jes negocia-
tions qui seront menees par Jes representants des 
ckux parties. Compte tenu de la cooperation non 
formelle que Jes deux organisations ont deja rea-
lisee jusqu'a present, Jes deux parties comptent 
ayec la possibilite de clefinir de secteurs de for-
mes et de methodes de cooperation nouveaux. En-
fin ,en ce qui concerne Jes territoires sur lesquels 
sera appliquee Jes Accords sur la constitution de 
la Cornmunaute economique europeenne, !'obstacle, 
Berlin Quest, considere par la CEE comme ap-
partenan t a son espace geographique, contraire-
rnent a la conception du bloc de l'Est, a fini par 
etre surmonte. 
COMMENT LE DEGEL A-T-IL COMMENCE? 
Le dialogue entre la CEE et le COMECON, 
mene de 1975 a 1980, a ete interrompu, d'un com-
mun accord, au moment ou il s'est avere claire-
ment qu'un accord n'etait pas possible. II a ete 
repris en juillet 1985, lorsque le secretaire du 
COMECON, M. Sychov a propose, par sa lettre 
adressce a la Commission, l'etablissement des re-
lations officielles entre ces deux organisations. 
Les entretiens menes de septembre 1986 a mai 
1988 par Jes fonctionnaires de la Commission des 
communautes europeennes et le Secretariat du 
COlviECON ont abouti a la signature de la Declara-
tion conjointe, une fois que l'avis fa\'orable a ete 
donne par le Parlement europeen, conformement 
a ]'article 235 des Accords de la CEE. Durant Jes 
entretiens menes a Bruxelles, le Commissaire des 
relations aYec l'etranger de la Communaute, M. 
Willy de Clercq, a souligne, dans le cadre du 
Conseil des ministres de la Communaute, que le 
gom·ernement a Moscou a\'ait exprime sa volonte 
d'organiser ses fu tures relations a,·ec la CEE sur 
la perspectiYe d'un accord plus large. 
D'un point de vue plus general, a precise M. de 
Clercq, un tel accord encouragerait l'ou\'erture 
toujours hesitante de l'URSS aux relations econo-
miques exterieures, contribuerait a ce que ce pays 
s'integre encore plus intensivement dans l'econo-
mie internationale et Jui assurerait un niYeau su-
perieur de liens aYec la Communaute. 
LES NEGOCUTIONS COMMENCENT 
M. de Clercq s'est prononce en fayeur d'un 
elargissement, des a present, des echangcs a\'ec 
l'URSS, qui devraient englober Jes domaines de 
l'ecologie, de I'energie, de I'energie nucleaire, des 
transports et de la peche dans la Mer baltique. 
Dans ce cas il s'agirait d'un «accord de coopera-
tion commerciale». Mais, en raison de la position 
de Ja Grande Bretagne, la declaration ne fait men-
tion que du «simple accord», Jaissant aux consul-
tations futures la tac.he de definir Ja nature et Jes 
dimensions des accords futurs . 
De l'avis de M. Andreotti, avant la fin de l'an-
nee et pendant le mandat de la Grece a Ja presi-
dence · de la Communaute, les mrn1stres des affai-
res etrangeres des pays membres de la Commu-
naute auront l'opportunitc de faire une apprecia-
tion des resultats de Ja premiL:re phase des cntrc. 
tiens, pour donner cnsuite le mandat a Ja Com-
mission d'aborder officiellemcnt Jes negociations 
en prJcisan t leur con tenu de fac;on plus concrete: 
II serait inutile de souligner que la perspective 
de ceuc procedure offre au pays assurant la pre-
siclence, en J'occurrence a la Grece, des possibilitcs 
extraorclinaires et la flexibilite en ce qui coneernc 
les initiatiYes qu'il 1.incera, et dont le but sera en 
mL·me temps l'elargissement et le cl~veloppement 
des affaires entre l'Ouest et !'Est, mais en meme 
temps aussi le clen~loppement des relations bilatc-
raks entre la Grece et J'URSS dans les secteurs 
correspondents de la future cooperation entre la 
CEE et le CO.\-!ECON. 
LA POSITIO;'( DE L'URSS 
Historique: la signature des AccorJs sur la 
constitution de la CEE (le 27 mars 1957) a pro-
\·oq~1J a .\loscou une reaction s~rie.us.:- d energi-
que. 
L'fnstitut de l'economie et des relations in-
ternationaux de l'Academie des sciences de Mos-
cou, a public, la meme annee qu'ont ete signes 
Jes Accords de Rome, 17 etudes sur le Marche 
europc.:-n commun, sur ]'Europe des syndicats et 
des monopoles, sur !'Europe au service des Etats-
Unis . sur «la sainte alliance contre le communisme 
et les travailleurs». 
En aot"1t 1962 ce mcme Institut a fait circuler 
32 eludes sur le theme: !'Orientation imperialiste 
tie !'Europe Occidentale. Ces etudes ant ete mains 
agressiYes, mais au fond aussi sfreres que Jes 
;1ri cJckntes. 
En decembre 1959 a ete signee, par Jes pays de 
I 'Est, Ja Charte du Conseil pour !'assistance eco-
nomique mutuetle (COMECON), dont le pream-
bule proclamait: «la contribution a un developpe-
ment plus rationnel des economies nationales et 
a l 'elfration du niveau de vie des populations». 
II y a lieu de remarquer ici que, pour les 
pays socialists, la conception selon laquelle le corn· 
merce est en soi un stimulant du de,·eloppement 
et du bien-etre, est relativement nom·etle et qu'el-
le n'apparait que recemment clans Ieur theorie des 
cchanges et des affaires internationaux. La suite 
du texte s'occupe plut6t de la notion du develop-
pement que de la qualite de la vie. 
Entre 1962 et 1972, alors que le commerce se 
developpait a une cadence tres rapide, les transac-
tions de tous Jes pays d'Europe de !'Est avec la 
Communaute ont monte de 7.4% a 12,5%. Durant 
cette periode rien de spectaculaire n'est intervenu 
quant a la position de l'URSS et des autres pays 
membres du COMECON a l'egard de la CEE, 
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LES PREMIERS CONTACTS 
Pour ces raisons, la declaration fai te par L. 
Brejncv au XV-eme Congres des syndicats soYieti-
•. Jc 20 mars 1972, que J'URSS deYrait prendre ques, . . . 
l'll compte !'existence de ce «groupement econom1-
<;llL' des pays capitalistes», s'est-elle fait un grand 
i.'·cho. 
Les premiers contacts ont eu lieu un an plus 
I • 1 .. 11 elc 1973, sous forme de dsite rendue par ~l I t I \... • 1 ; • 
k Secrctaire du COMECON, M. Fad1eev au pres1-
lknt en cxercice du Conseil des ministres de la 
CEE, le Danois \.1. Norgard. 
En fevrier 1975, la delegation conduite par le 
nireclL"ur de la Commission chargee des relations 
:1\'L'C I'ctranger, 1\1. Wellenstein, qui a recontr~ a 
1\-loscou lcs fonctionnaires du Secretariat du 
CO\IIECON, s'est limitee aux seuls contracts pro-
locolaircs. 
Un pas plus decide a ete franchi l'annee sui-
\·:1nt-:, le 16 fJuier 1976, lorque le president en 
(''(erc.:icc du Comite executif du COMECO.\". \l. 
v,'ciss, a remis au president du Conseil des mini-
st rc:.s clc la CEE le pro jet d'un accord-cadre entrc ces 
dvux onranisations. La reponse donnee par la 
Co111111un~ulc en octobre 1976 precisait que les n~-
gociations commerciales entre la CEE et le CO· 
M r:CON n'ctaient pas possibiles et que dans cette 
Jll'L'miL:re phase seul un echange d'informations et 
dl''tl,Jnnccs statistiques semblai:t etre possible. 
En scptembre 1977, une delegation conduite 
par le president du Comite executif du C0:\11E-
CON et par le vice-president du gouvernement rou; 
111:1in, M. Marinescu, a accepte de rencontrer a 
Bruxclles non seulement le president du Cons:-il 
des ministres de la CEE, ;\1. Simonet, mais aussi. 
L'I cl·la rour la premie-re fois, le Yice-president de 
la Commission. responsacle des relations a,:ec 
l'L:tran~c1·, M. Haferkamp. 
En mars 1978 le COMECON redent au meme 
s11iL'I L'n rroposant pour !~ mai prochain le debut 
des puurrarlcrs officiels en n1e de la conclusion 
d'un accord-cadre: dont Jes bases aYaient ete pro-
po~ccs l'll fcvrier 1976. 
L'INCOMPATIBLE 
Ccpcndant, Jes entretiens menes a Moscou (en 
mai 1978) et a Bruxelles (en juillet 1978) ont du 
sc hcurtcr a ]'obstacle qui etait celui de J'incom-
patibilitc des positions de la CEE et du COME-
CON quant au caractere de !'accord envisaee. Au 
rond, tlcux questions particulieres se posaie;t: eel-
le des competences, tres delicate du point de ,-ue 
.iuridique mais facile a resoudre du point de vue 
politiquc, et fa question fondamentale qui concer· 
nait le contenu de I'eventuel accord. 
ll est incontestable que Jes competences de la 
Communaute sont tres Iarges, ainsi que Jes pre-
cisent Jes articles 113 et 235 des Accords de Rome. 
Pour ce qui est du COMECON, la question 
qui se pose est celle de sa\'oir dans quelle mesure 
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ses competences sont-elles symetriques. II n'y a 
pas de doute que le COMECON soit une organisa-
tion intergouvernementale, sans pouvoir suprana-
tional. Aucun acte du CO~iECON ne peut etre 
adopte sans le consc-nsus des pays m::mbres. Con-
trairement a la Commission de Ja Communaute 
europeenne, ni le Comite executif ni Jc Secretariat 
du COMECON ne peuvent a2ir au nom des pays 
membres pour ce qui est des - questions relevant de 
leur decision nationale. Le programme du COME· 
CON, adopte en juillet 1971, envisageant le de· 
Yeloppement de !'Organisation dans le sens, de 
)'integration, stipule (Chapitre 1, article 3) que: 
«Les pays membres du CO!\tECON coordonneront 
Jeur politique economiqu<! ctranl!O::n: dans I'interet 
de la normalisation des relation; commerciales in 
tcrnationales, en premier lieu en vue de la sup 
pression de Ja discrimination sur ce plan». 
llN PRE~lIER RAPPROCHE~IENT 
La redsion de ce tc"'tc, formulee en 1974, 
preyoyait que !'Organisation «appuierait les pays 
membres dans Jes preparatifs, Jes consultations et 
]'application des mesures communes», qui se rap· 
portent plus specialement au de,·eloppement des 
echanges de biens et de serdces entre Jes pays 
membres, ainsi qu'avec lcs pa~·s tiers. Le terme 
nou\'eau de «consultations» nous ra.ppelle le debut 
de coordination des questions politiques au sein 
de la CEE. 
Les competences du COMECON peuvent s'eten-
dre a tous Jes domaines sur lesquels tous les pays 
membres tombent d'accord, ainsi qu'avec d'autres 
Etats ou organisations intemationales. Par con. 
!'C?quent, le probleme des competences peut etre 
considere des !ors comme resolu. sans que pour 
autant ii soit reconnu comme tel par la CEE, ce 
fait etant deplore par les experts des pays de 
l'Est. 
En fait, la position de la CE est realiste. Cel-
Je-ci considere que la COMECON ne connait pa,; 
d'organisme ou de mecanisme de politique com-
merciale en vue d'une politique commune efficace. 
Les pays du COMECON ont des positions juri-
diques differentes a l'egard de la Communaute. 
En mai 1978 la CEE et le COMECON ont ac· 
ceptc que tout eventuel futur accord devrait etre 
conforme aux buts objectifs pratiques et aux dis· 
positions constitutionnelles des deux parties. 
LE PROJET D'ACCORD 
II est clair que le probleme du contenu des 
entretiens sera plus important que celui des com-
petences. Le texte de J'accord, propose par le 
COMECON n'a jamais ete officiellement publie. Le 
projet d'accord constate l'etablissement des rela-
tions officielles entre Jes dcux Organisations, sur 
la base des dispositions de l'Acte final d'Helsinki 
(article 2), et notamment sur la base du principe 
de respect de la sou\'erainete, de la non-ingerence 
dans lt:s affaires intericures et de cooperation 
cntre Jes 2ou,·emements. Dans la suite, le Projet 
cnun1cre J~ secteurs de cooperation: amelioration 
des conditions du commerce, organisation de con-
ferences et de colloques, renforcement des echan-
ges dans le domaine agricole etc. 
II a ete enYisage, en \'UC de la mise en Oeu\Te 
de !'Accord, de mettre en place une commission 
mixte qui serait composee de representants des 
deux organisations et de pays membres. 
II en decoule Jes remarques suivantes: d'abord, 
la reference a la CSCE (a !'Acte 5inal d'Helsinki) 
est importante, bien que la formulation soit dif-
ferente de celle que l'on pourrait lire dans le 
«deuxieme panier» de l'Aote final. Ce qui carac-
tcrise Ja CSCE, c'est, en premier lieu, une philo-
sophic gene.rale des relations economiques entre 
Jc~ pays appartenant aux systemes economi.ques et 
sociaux differents. Le lien entre le commerce et 
la cooperation accentue la necessite de deYelopper 
l'un et l'autre, d'une maniere stable mais differen-
cicc, d'une maniere qui permette que soient creees 
tou tes Jes conditions necessaires pour mieux ex-
ploiter Jes possibilites qui se presentcront au 
niveau du diveloppement economique des parte· 
naires. On y YOit se re.peter, m·ec un accent parti-
culicr, tous Jes secteurs figurant dans l'Acte final: 
le commerce, la cooperation, Jes statistiques, la 
coordination, la protection de l'en\'ironnement. 
Une serie de dispositions \'Ont au-dela du con-
tenu de l'Acte final. En effct, ii est envisage d'in· 
troduire la clause de Ja nation privilegiee sans 
limitations, sans que, pour autant, le terme de 
«reciprocite» soi t mentionne. 
·· REUNIT ET DIVISE» 
En novembre 1978 la Communaute a fait une 
importante concession, en acceptant, en principe, 
et pour la premiere fois, de conclure un accord 
m•ec le COMECON. Cependant, clans la reponse 
donnee par le COMECON le probleme de proce-
dure a de notl\'eau emerge .... II est a noter que 
le~ membres fondateurs du COMECON ont ete: 
J'URSS, la Bulgarie, la Tchecoslovaquie, la Hon-
grie, la Pologne et la Roumanie. L'Allemagne de 
l'F.st et l'Albanie sont deyenues membres a part 
cntiere du CO:vt'ECON apres la constitution de 
cclui-ci. Mais, l'Albanie ne prend part aux activites 
du COMECO~ depuis 1961. La Yougosla,·ie (196-1), 
la Mongolic 0962), Cuba (1972) et Ja Viet-Nam par· 
ticipcnt a differents degres aux activites des com-
missions permanentes du COMECON. 
L'importance economique du COMECON est 
dccrite dans une recente etude du «The Econo-
mist»: »Le COMECON, soutient-on clans cette etu-
de, est important. II reunit, et parfois divise, les 
principaux antagonistes cconomiques et militaires 
de !'Occident. Les pays membres du COMECON 
representent un dixieme de Ja population mo.ndiale 
et produisent, sans aucun doute, plus d'un dixieme 
du revenu mondial,» 
POSITIONS MUTUELLES 
La position de ld CEE a l'egard des pays a eco-
nomie planifiee est determinee, au fond, par les 
Accords de Rome, don t les articles 111 et 113 re-
gissen t l'activite commerciale de la Communaute 
a l'egard des pays tiers. 
Les pays socialistes n'ont pas de «politiq11e 
occide11tale commune». L'existence du COMECON 
en soi ililfluence le commerce entre l'Est et l'Ouest. 
Bien entendu, il s'agit d'une influence directe, 
sporadique, qui ne repose sur aucune base insti-
tu tionnalisee ou organisee. Mais pourtant un dia-
logue a partir des positions claires s'est engage 
entre Jes deux orgMJisa.tions d'integratior.. 
Des contrats et des arrangements speciaux ont 
ete conclu aussi avec des paiys de !'Est. La Commu-
naute a negocie au nom et pour le compte de ses 
membrs avec les pays de }'Est, dans le cadre du 
GATT. 
REGLEMENTATIONS UNILATERALES 
Au cou'l"s de la periode transitoke, qui s'es,t 
ecoulee le 31 decembre 1969, les pays membres de 
la CEE, conformement a !'article 111 des Accords 
de Rome, ont garxl.e le droit exo1usif de negocier 
les accords commerciaux avec les pays tiers, dans 
le cadre et dans les limites des consultations pre-
alables avec la Commission et avec les autres 
pays membres. 
Apres 1970, aux termes de !'article 113, les 
competences des Etats devaient, en principe, etre 
transferees au niveau de la Communaute, de meme 
que les negociations en V'l.le de .la conclusion d'ar-
rangements autonomes, unilateraux, avec les pays 
tiers. Au cours de 1974, la Communaute a pri'> 
!'initiative d'appliquer la procedure, deja negqciee. 
d'etablissemen,t des relaroions a.vec les pays de l'Est 
et de prise de dispositions en vue de !'assurance de 
sa politique commerciale autonome. 
En mai 1974 le Consei.l a fait sarnir que la 
Communaute etait prete a aborder les pourparlers 
avec les pays de l'Est qui le souhaitent. En novem-
bre de cette annee-la, un texte, sous forme d'une 
sorte de memoire de la Commission a ete envoye 
a tous les pays du COMECON. Le texte contenait 
une proposition du plan des pourparlers entre la 
Communaute et chaoque pays de !'Est en particu-
lier. Le plan fixait le principe de reciprocite con-
cernant les avantages et les obligations, confor-
mement a la meme formule qui a ete integree e11-
s11ite dans le «deuxieme panier» de l'Acte final d' 
Helsinski. Dans ce texte, Jes parties contractantes 
sont tombees d'accord pour appliquer la clause 
de la nation la plus privilegiee en matiere des 
tarifs et des taxes. Pour ce qui est des contingents, 
ill faJJ.ait rechercher les voies et les moyens de 
lioberaLi.sat-ion des importations. La Commission pre· 
cisait qu'en ce qui concerne les echanges de pro-
duits agricoles, les principes et les mecanismes de 
la politique agricole commune ne pourraient pas 
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faire l'objet des pourparlers, au nh-eau bilateral, 
ii a ete prevu la clause d'esquivage pour Jes pro-
duits delicats, inspiree par !'article XIX du GATT, 
relatif aux paiements et aux credits. Le plan pre-
\'Oit que ces questions seront reglees ponctuelle-
ment, cas par cas. Enfin, une commission mLxte 
serait mise en place en vue de Ja mise en oeuvre 
de !'Accord. 
Compare aux accords commerciau.,;: bilat<!raux, 
que Jes pays de Ja CEE a\'aient conclus a\'ec les 
pays de !'Est durant la periode precedente, ce 
plan. au fond, n'etait pas different. Cependant, 
les accords precedents contenaient dans une plu<; 
Jame mesure des objectifs concrets du develop-
pe;1ent des echanges commrciaux. La clause de la 
nation la pl11s privilegiee representait 1111 principe 
ge11eral. ime loi. Pour ce qui est des limitations 
des contingents, les procedures precedentes avai-
ent ete plus favorables pour les pays de l'Est. Par-
fois, les lettres ajoutees a ces accords . promettai-
ent aux signitaiires, c'est a dire aux pavs de !'Est, 
Ja suppression des limitations speciales concer-
nant Jes contingents de produits. 
Par consequent, il serait possible de supposer 
qu'independamment du refus de principe de nego-
cier a\'ec la EE, les pa,ys de l'Est a\'aient Ja pos-
sibilite de considerer le projet d'accord comme 
moins fa\'orable pour eux, en comparaison avec 
Jes accords commerciaux precedents, et cela vauit 
surtout pour Jes pays qui ne sont pas membres 
du GATT. 
«SANS ECART» 
En raison de !'absence d'un accord entre la 
CEE et les pays de !'Est, la politique autonome des 
la CEE en matiere de commerce «est aujourd'hui 
encore en Yigueur». 
La politique agricole commune, en principe, 
ne concerne que Jes echanges commerciaux, stricto 
sensu. La cooperation economique demeure, corn-
me cela a deja et:e mentionn.e, dans Jes competences 
de-, Etats. 
Pour regler et coondormer l'application de la 
cooperation - economique, le Conseil de la CEE 
a defini, par son arrete du 22 juillet 1974. la pro-
cedure des consultations. Les pays membres infor-
ment Jes autres pays membres et la Commission 
sur 'les textes des accords de coo~ration qu'il,; 
ont paraphes avcc les pays tiers. En general, il-, 
i,nfunnent la Commi.ssion sur les .plans des nego-
ciations, sur les accords de coo~ration, ainsi que 
des mesnres envisagees dans le cadre des accords, 
qui pourraient eventuellement affecter les echan-
ges commerciaux. L'objectif de cette mesure est. 
d'empeoher itoute tentati.ve de l'ecarter de la 
politique commune en matiere de commerce. En 
rn~me temps, moyennant les pourparlers qui pour-
raient avoir lieu l la demande d'un Etat ou a 
)'initiative de la Commission, la Communaute as-
c;ure !'information susceptible de faciliter la co-
ordination des actions des pays membre.s. Dans 
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l'impossibilitc de degager un paquet complet de 
mc5ures de sa politique commerciale, la CEE a 
reussi 3 se -::harger de mener Jes pourparlers avec 
certains pays de !'Est sur certaines questions sp:; 
ci?.les. Quoique Jes p::lys de !'Est nt· rc>cc,muss•:r:t 
pas la Communaute. des pourparlers sur Jes re 
g/cments !ecl,niqtt~S ant cte menes a\'ant meni~ 
que la periode de transition ne se soit ecoulee. 
ROUMANIE : LA PREl\IIERE 
La Roumanie a ete la premiere ,a accepter la 
si!mature, en novembre 1976, un accord bilateral 
su-r la yente de produits textiles. L'accord a ete 
rc>nouyeJe en 1977. Les tentatiYes de passer des 
accords commerciaux bilateraux avec deux autres 
paYs, la Hongrie et Ja Pologne, ne se sont pas 
rnldet's par Jes resultats souhaites, principalement 
en raison des difficultes d'ordre politique, con-
cemant notamment Ja question de la clause terri-
torill!e. Tout accord conclu par la Communaute avec 
Jes pays tiers porte sur !'ensemble des territoires 
d"application des Accords de Rome (article 227), 
qui comprend egalement Berlin-Quest, sur Ja base 
d 'une dJclaration du gom·ernement ouest-allemand, 
iointe aux Accords de Rome. Cependant, c'est no-
toire, ceci n'est pas accepte par Jes pays socialis-
tes qui ne reconnaissent pas l'appartenance de 
Berlin-Ouest a J'Allemagne Federale. Toutefois, la 
Hongrie (Yers Ja fin 1978) et la Pologne (en decem-
1'!·e 1979) ont signe un accord sur Jes produits tex-
tiles, m·ec une resen·e concernant la question du 
territoire. Cette formule a ete reprise ensuite par 
!a Bulgarie. Les difficultes au sujet de cette clause 
territoriale se sont manifestees aussi pendant les 
rourparlers sur la peche. une fois que Jes Neuf 
ant decide, vers la fin 1976, d'etendre Ja zone de 
peche le long de Jeurs cotes. a 200 lieues. En de-
cembre 1976 le Conseil a unilateralement exclu Ja 
Roumanie et Ja Bulgarie des eaux territoriales de 
la Communaute, car ces Etats riverains de la Mer 
~oire ne pouvaient pas offri<r une garantie finan-
ciere aux pecheurs de la Communaute. 
Le Conseil a fait connaitre a la RDA, a la 
Pologne et a l'URSS Jes contingents de peche au 
cours des premiers mois de 1977, en conviant en 
meme temps ces pays a aborder avec la Commu-
naute Jes pOUI1.Parlers en vue d'un accord sur la 
peche. Au cours du · mois de mars 1977 ces trois 
pays se sont presentes a Bruxelles, mais ont re-
fuse de reconnaiitre la competence de la Com-
munaute, n'acceptant que la presence des dele-
gues de la Commission, qui etait responsable des 
questions · relevant des domaines de !'agriculture 
et de la peche. 
Les pourparlers ant fini dans !'impasse et 
c'est la qu'a eolate une crise serieuse (en oc.tobre 
1977). Le resultat en a ete que les chalutiers sovi-
etiques etaient completement exclus des eaux de 
la Communaute, en reponse aux mesures d'inter-
diction que l'URSS a appliquees contre Jes pe-
cheurs de la Communaute dans la Met de Barents. 
Un accord technique sur l'acier a ete signe le 12 
avril 1978 entre la Communaute et la Tchecoslova-
quic. 
La Roumanie est !'unique pays de !'Est a avoir 
emprurae la Yoie de reconnai,ssam.ce de la Com-
munaute, Apres la signature des accords sur les 
produits textiles et l'acier, la deuxieme etape a 
commence en 1979 par Jes pourparlers en vue d'un 
accord general de commerce de produits industriels 
et de la mise en place d'une commission mixte 
entre la CEE et la Roumanie. Par sa position :i 
la Conference d'Helsinki et a Belgrade, la Rou-
manie a essaye de se distancier du COMECON dans 
sa poli tique etrangere. 
LA PARTICIPATION DES ETATS-UNIS 
Les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont influen-
cees not::irnment, depuis la fin de la demiere guer-
re , par J'instauration, sur une initiative des Etats-
Unis, d'un groupe de consultation, Coordinating 
Com (COCOM), qui n'a pas de status officiel et 
dor.t k siege es t a Paris. Les membres du COCOM, 
ql!i a commence a fonctionner le I-er janvier 1950, 
sont Jes paYs de l'OTAN, a !'exception de l'Islande. 
A ses tran\ux prend part aussi le Japon, et depuis 
recemment l'Espagne. Cependant, aucun lien orga-
nique n'existe entre l'OTAN et le COCOM. 
Pour assurer une base legale au travail de 
coordination a,·ec ses allies, Jes Etats-Unis ant 
Yote en 1951 une Joi dite «Battle Acrt» , qui precise 
que tout pays exportant aux pays communistes 
des biens d'importance strntegique sera pnve de 
l'aide militaire et economique de Washington. L'-
objectif premier du COCOM est de dresser Jes 
listes des b iens se trouYant sous !'embargo. Les 
decisions du groupe sont prises par consensus. Les 
representants des gouyemements se mettent d'ac-
cord sur une liste minimum, qui ·represente pour 
chaquc pa~·s membre une so1·te de recommandation. 
Chaque pays a le droit, conformement a sa legisla-
tion, d'elargir cette liste, tel est le cas des Etats-
Unis, mais aucun n'a le droit de la reduire, les listes 
sont re1."Ues tous les deux ans . Les criteres d'inscnip· 
tion des produits dans les Iistes du COCOM sont 
differents. II y a, en effet, trois categories de 
oroduits: Jes produits sous !'embargo strict, Jes 
produits qui peuvent et re exportes en quantites 
limitees et Jes produits soumis au contr6le. En 
1952 Ja liste du COCOM cornprenait la quasi moitie 
des produits destines aux echanges internationaux. 
A 111eure actuelle, trois criteres de base sont pris 
en consideration pour !'inscription des produits sur 
la liste d'embargo. II s'agit des produits a caractere 
militaire (armements, equipement militaire ou Jes 
produits destines a la fabrication d'armements), Ja 
technologie (toutes les technologies de pointe) et les 
produits rares, dont l'offre sur le marche est limitee 
par rapport au potentiel militaire des pays com 
munistes. La limitation des produits dont !'expor-
tation est interdite a ete differente, et toujours 
en fonction de la d6terioraition des relations inter-
nationailes ou de Jeur amelioration, et notamment 
des relations entre Jes USA et l'URSS. 
LES REACT!O.\'S 
L'application des mesures du COC0'.\11 a pro-
voque de \'iolentes reactions . Meme Jes industriels 
americains con testaien t Jes mesures d 'interdiction, 
qui ont coute cher l'economie americaine . Quoique 
dans la pratique !'administration americaine don-
ne tres sou\'ent son accord pour Jes differentes 
derogations de ces regles , la procedure est assez 
Iongue, et les organismes de commerce exterieur, 
face au manque de clarte, aux hesitations et a 
!'incertitude preferent orienter Jes commandes de 
leurs clients dans un sens different. 
L'inflexibilite des interdictions americaines est 
intimoment liee aux orientations politiques du 
moment. L'application de ces interdictions a con-
nu assez d'inconsequences, de rigueur et de lenteur 
bureaucratique. En d~pit de ces problemes, certains 
produits modernes, chaque fois qu'ils ne fiiruraient 
pas sur Jes listes sous !'embargo, passaie~t pour 
anachroniques, vetustes, vieillis. 
La question a ete souvent posee de savoir 
si ces reglements sont efficaces et dans quelle 
mesure ils rend difficiles Jes preparatifs militaires 
de l'URSS. L'histoire a montre que toute politique 
d'embargo contribue au renforcement du potentiel 
productif du pays vise par !'embargo, en poussant 
ce pays vers l'autarcie. 
Compte tenu de l'etat des faits et des resultats 
realises jusqu'a present par l'application des mesu-
res citees la question .qui s'impose est celle de 
savoir si le COCOM est peut-etre inutile, voire 
nuisible, certains milieux americains constatent que 
cette pratique est a son declin. Et cela pour deux 
raisons: a) a cause de son inefficacite a J'egard de 
l'TJRSS. Les experts americains ont calcule que J'ex-
nortation de la technologie americaine represente 
Om% du produit national de l'URSS, b) parce que 
le~ allies americains se montrent de plus en plus 
reticents a ces mesures . 
Em ce qui concerne concretement l'URSS, qui 
a des affinites envers la technologie des Etats-Unis, 
!'existence du COOM represente tres souvent une 
occasion exceptionnelle pour les societes europeen-
nes de s'assurer des oommandes, au detriment, bien 
entendu, de l'industrie americaine. 
La mentalite anticommuniste des leaders ame-
ricains a ete, probablement, le facteur principal de 
la competitivite europeenne, notamment a !'occasion 
de la conculison d'un nombre important d'accords 
avec !'Est. Quant a !'existence eventuelle, a !'Est, 
d'une organisation analogue au COCOM, nous devons 
reconnaitre qu'elle n'a jamais ete remarquee, pas 
plus que les represailles sovietiques au moment 
ou a commence le processus d'exportation de techno-
Jogie de l'Est vers l'Ouest. Durant la guerre de 
Viet..Naim, les Sovietiques n'ont jama.~s cesse de 
vendre aux Americains la platine, le paladium, le 
titane, le chrome et d'autres metaux precieux d'im-
portance strategique incontestable. 
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LA PIERESTROIKA 
Tant pour le passe. La Pierestroika et la nou-
\"elle politique economique sovietique ont contribuJ 
au changement de bien des choses. Dans son line 
«La Pierestroi:ka», Gorba tche,· precise: «Toutes ces 
'sanctions' , Jes 'embargos' de la part des Etats-Unis 
ont clar ifie pas ma! de questions. Nous a,·ons tire 
un enseignement du refus des Etats-Cnis et des 
:rntres pays occidentaux de \"endre Ja teclmologie 
cle pointe a l'URSS. Peut-etre precisement pour 
cette raison pou,·ons-nous remarquer aujourd-hui 
dans notre pays une \"eritable floraison dans Jes 
secleurs de l'informatique, de Ja technologie des 
ordinateurs et dans Jes autres secteurs de la science 
et de la technologie». {«La Pierestroi:ka», pp. 161 
-162). 
Le conseiller special de Gorbatche,·, l'acaclemi-
cien Aganbeghian, precise dans son ou\'rage «La 
Pierestroi"ka dans l'economie», dans le chapitrl.! 
intitule «Que faut-il changer en URSS jusqu'a !'an 
2000»: «Les accords d'Helsinki ont commence a 
encourager Jes relations economiques internatio-
nales mutuellement utiles contre toutes Jes mesures 
de discrimination dans le commerce exterieur. 
Malheureusement , les accords du «detL'.:ieme panier» 
sont systematiquement violes, principa!ement a cause 
de la position des Etats-Unis. Une organisation speC!a· 
le a ete mise en place, qui impose Jes diffcrentes 
limitations et controle Jes produits que Jes pay<, 
capitalistes exportent vers l'URSS. Recemment on 
a decouvert une suite d'exemples de mesures 
discriminatoires unilaterales, prises principalement 
par les Etats-Unis, mais aussi par certains autres 
pays capitalistes. dans le domaine du commerce 
exterieur a,·ec !'Union So\"ietique». Il est bien clair 
que l'academicien A. G. Aganbeghian a eu a !'esprit 
!es limitations imposees par le COCO!\L 
LA POSITION DE LA CEE 
Cette question a ete exhausth·ement traitee 
aussi par le Parlement europeen, en fevrier 1987, 
sur la base d'un rapport detaille du depute beige. 
Tout en refusant d'appliquer !'embargo sur !'export-
ation du ble, les Etats-Unis demandaient a leurs 
allies de renforcer le controle du commerce avec 
l'URSS. I,J ne faudrait pa,s perdre de n.1e le fait 
que Jes Etats-Uni-s et Jes pays europeens s'accusent 
mutuellement de protectionnisme et que dans ce 
secteur, le danger est reel. Certes, ii arri\'e que Jee; 
pays europeens craignent que certaines interven-
tions des Etats-Unis ont pour but tout simplement 
de proteger Jes interets purement nationaux. Nous 
deYons souligner ici qu'aucun pays de la CEE 
n'a .iamais demande la suppression du COCOM, ni 
exprime Ja volonte de quitter ce forum. L'adMsion 
de l'Espagne a cette organisation est une preuve 
de l'etat d'esprit existant, favorable au maintien 
de ce controle, avec quelques ameliorations. 
II a ete propose, en effet, que le probleme soit 
resolu par la constitution d'un nou,·el organisme 
24 
juridique, qui serait different du COCOM. Par 
exemplc, ii a ete propose la conclusion d'un accord 
international aux regles et aux Iois de fonction-
ncment fermes, avec les droits et les obligations 
clairement definis pour tous les adherants. 
* 
* * 
L'Accord de Bruxelles du 25 juin 1988 sur la 
reconnaissance officielle de la Communaute euro-
peenne par !'Union SoYietique, represcnte, tout 
simplement, un accord-cadre. II n'y a pas de doute 
qu'il y aura lieu de proceder a de nouvelles nego-
ciations, longues, pour en definir le contenu. 
Le hasard a Youlu que durant cette meme perio-
de la Bulgarie assure la presidence au COMECON. 
Ce fait a contribue a !'organisation de 1la prochaine 
Yisite en Grece du President Jivkov, en vue des 
pourparlers avec le premier ministre grec, qui est 
en meme temps le president en exercice du Conseil 
des Communautes europeennes. 
Cette rencontre attire une attention particuliere, 
d'une part a cause des relations intimes qui existent 
aujourd 'hui entre !es cleux pays voisins, et d'autre 
part, a cause d'une certaine clifferenciation qui se 
manifeste au niYeau des relations entre Sofia et 
Moscou, quant a !'application fidele de la Pierestroi:-
ka en Bulgarie. II semble qu'en depit des declara-
tions officielles des responsables bulgares sur l'ajus-
tement de 'l'economie natiunal au programme dee; 
reformes de Gorbatchev, aucun progres n'ait ete 
enregistre et que rneme un soupc;on d'ajustement 
n'ait ete tente. Le limogeage, en juillet dernier, de 
Tchoudomir Alexandrov, considere comme heritier 
de JiYkov, et qui s 'etait prononce ouvertement en 
fayeur de la Pierestro'ika, sous pretexte que son 
beau-pere aurait persecute les communistes sous ]'oc-
cupation allemande, incite a poser pas ma! de 
questions, dont celle de savoir si la Bulgarie finira 
par presider au COMECON dans le stricte respect 
des principes de la Pierestroi:ka. 
Pour ces raisons la position de la Grece dans 
le role, de president en exercice sera tres delicate 
lorsqu'il faudra prendre des positions de compromis. 
EVOLUTION POSSIBLE 
D'un point de vue general, des perspectives 
favorables se dessinent a !'horizon, ne serait-ce que 
pour l'URSS. Dans sa recente declaration faite 
dernnt les communistes italiens, Gorbatchev a pre-
cise que «la position de l'URSS et du Parti sovieti-
que a l'egard de !'Europe est determinee par le 
fait que nous nous considerons avant tout comme 
Europeens». 
Aujourd'hui la division de !'Europe en deux 
parties est consideree comme une catastrophe histo-
rique. On croit aussi que cette division a eu pour 
les pa-ys de l'E11rope de l'Est de serieuses conse-
quences qui ont exerce une i11f lllence sur leur af-
faiblissement. Cependant, une attention particuliere 
est attiree sur le fait que le sort politique, voire 
personnel, de Gorbatchev dependra de sa reforme 
economique. 
Enfin, les pays europeens ant besoin de s,\\"oir 
clans quel sens evoluira J'economie sovietique, qui 
eprouve une faim intense de technologie, de credits 
et d'ouverture sur le plan commercial. Gorbatchev. 
empnmtera-t-il la voie de conclusion d'arrangements 
plus larges avec Jes Etats-Unis et le Japon, danc; 
une perspecti\'e de voir la cote occidentale du Paci-
fique rejoindre, dans le sens economique, la cote 
correspondente de !'Union Sovietique? · Ou bien 
GorbatcheY se tournera fermement \'ers !'Europe, 
pour construire ce batiment qui s'etendra de l'Atlan-
Iique a l'Oural. Cette seconde Yoie nous parait plus 
probable. 
* * * * * * * 
(4) 
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The EEC and CMEA * 
The Problem of Mutual Recognition 
Mikhail Gorbachev has multiplied his appeals for a rapprochement be-
tween the CMEA and the EEC in recent months. Has this been to keep each 
of the CMEA member countries from developing too close and too diffuse 
ties with the EEC, or is it instead a way to falsely reassure Eastern 
Europe? On January 31, 1986, the EEC finally agreed to discuss the 
establishment of official relations with the CMEA and to resume the 
dialogue that was interrupted in 1980. However, at the Twenty-seventh 
Congress of the CPSU in February 1986, Gorbachev at no point took up 
the problem of relations with the EEC. Why this silence after so many 
gestures of goodwill? Whatever the answer, negotiations ought to be 
resumed in order to arrive at a joint declaration (desired by the USSR) of 
real scope (desired by the EEC). The author summarizes the different 
stages of the negotiations since 1974 and the positions presently held by 
the principals. 
The history of relations between the EEC, created in 1957, and the 
CMEA, created in 1949, is divided into five major phases correspond-
ing to relations between the two Europes. The first, from 1958 to 1964, 
was marked by a series of confrontations and deep ideological dis-
agreements. 
Whenever the USSR shifts course, a change in the CMEA attitude 
toward the EEC may be observed as well. Between 1965 and 1972, this 
took the form of a rapprochement between the two institutions. Official 
exchanges and the declarations of Soviet leaders of the period resulted 
in the opening of a long period of dialogue punctuated by prolonged 
silences. 
"'French text© 1986 by Documentation frarn;:aise . "CEE-CAEM: Le probleme 
de la reconnaissance mutuelle," Le Courrier des Pays de I 'Est, no . 305 (April 
1986) . Translated with permission. Translated by Michel Vale. 
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From 1975 to 1977, the two communities evinced the incompatibil-
ity of the two organizations. From 1978 to 1980, the dialogue ended in 
a confirmation of disagreement on the nature and the extent of a 
possible convention . 
Since 1984, a new course of simple recognition has been under way. 
The following presents a calendar of negotiations and respective posi-
tions , with special stress on the latest meetings and declarations. For 
some months now true progress has been perceptible in negotiations , 
which today gives reason to hope for the signing of an agreement 
between the EEC and the CMEA. 
The calendar of negotiations 
Since 1972, the Soviet leaders, doubtlessly concerned about the eco-
nomic and political progress being made by the EEC, have made many 
statements reviving the Khrushchevian idea of negotiations between the 
CMEA and the EEC . 
On August 27, 1973, at Copenhagen, N. Fadeev, secretary general 
of the CMEA, had an informal meeting with the president of the EEC 
Council of the Ministers . He expressed the desire to strengthen detente 
and cooperation and proposed a study of the framework and content of 
possible discussions. From February 4 to 6, 1975, N. Wellenstein 
headed a Community delegation to Moscow. The first discreet contacts 
were followed by a series of exchanges of opinion among experts , 
permitting a comparison of the function and the areas of authority of 
the two communities. 
The formal inauguration of an EEC-CMEA dialogue dates from 
mid-February 1976, when M. Weiss, chairman of the Executive Com-
mittee of the CMEA, submitted to F. Thorne, acting chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the EEC, a draft outline of an agreement within 
the framework of a prolongation of the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe signed at Helsinki in 1975 . 
The CMEA questioned the provisions of the Final Act, which it 
deemed unsatisfactory, and sought to renegotiate those that it consid-
ered unfavorable toward the socialist countries. This draft outline of an 
agreement contained a number of propositions, in particular in the area 
of trade between the two institutions, as well as on diverse aspects of 
economic cooperation. The CMEA wanted to establish bilateral and 
multilateral cross relations with the EEC and among members of each 
community, to diversify trade in order to reduce imbalances in East-
West trade, and to obtain most favored nation status. 
In an exchange of letters between March and November 1976, the 
Council of the Community did not rule out the possibility of a skeleton 
agreement between the EEC and the CMEA, but it displayed caution 
with regard to the allocation of competence between the skeleton agree-
ment and bilateral trade agreements . Thus , it proposed that economic , 
industrial, and financial cooperation retain a bilateral character be-
tween the members of the two communities. A general model for a 
bilateral trade agreement was presented in November 1976. The con-
clusion of a trade agreement in November 1976 between the EEC and 
Romania was in line with the designs of the EEC. 
True dialogue did not actually begin until May 29-30 , 1978, at 
Moscow, with a meeting between N. Fadeev and W. Haferkamp, vice-
chairman of the EEC and charge of foreign relations . Even though the 
two parties remained entrenched in their positions , they showed a 
desire to arrive at an agreement and drew up a procedure for discus-
sions. A group of experts was commissioned to define more concretely 
the area of application and the modalities of an agreement between the 
EEC and the CMEA on July 25-28 , 1978, at Brussels. 
Despite the slow progress of the efforts, two summit meetings were 
held, one at Brussels in November 1978 , and the other at Moscow on 
November 26-28, 1979. In November 1978, Mr. Haferkamp accepted 
the amendments of the November 1974 EEC proposal as well as the 
trade principles figuring in the Helsinki Final Act. 
Throughout this period, negotiations basically brought to light the 
extent of differences over the functions and the authority of each of 
these institutions vis-a-vis their member countries in the area of EEC-
CMEA relations, over the role of a joint commission that would super-
vise exchanges, over the extension of most favored nation status to the 
CMEA, and finally over the CMEA's refusal to accept that the EEC 
was competent to negotiate on behalf of West Berlin. 
The functions and competence of each community 
The EEC deemed the 1976 CMEA draft unacceptable and incompatible 
with the institutional rules of the Community. For the EEC, the funda-
mental differences that exist between the two blocs must be defined and 
mutually acknowledged; to continue negotiations, the functions, struc-
tures, institutional rules, and composition of each community (the 
latter point refers to the participation of West Berlin in the EEC) must 
be taken into account. Thus, mutual recognition is necessary. 
Originally, the CMEA was merely a body for international coopera-
tion in which there were no provisions for international trade activities. 
The CMEA later undertook measures in 1974 to acquire this compe-
tence. It amended the 1959 charter with an article that stipulated that 
"international agreements may be concluded with the member coun-
tries of the Council, third countries, and international organizations. '' 1 
But, although the CMEA thus acquired a legal capacity to conclude 
international agreements and its organs were enabled to sign them, it 
did not have the capacity to do so on behalf of its member nations . The 
CMEA is not able to engage in trade as an institution as can the EEC, 
because it does not have the same status. 
The member countries of the CMEA do not have a common policy 
on foreign trade or foreign tariffs. They are in principle free to negoti-
ate trade agreements separately with the EEC, while since 1975 the 
EEC member countries cannot conclude separate trade agreements 
with third countries without the intermediacy of Brussels. This is why 
the EEC proposed that it conclude agreements with each of the CMEA 
countries. It justified this position by the absence of a supernational 
authority within the CMEA similar to the EEC Commission or of an 
organization authorized to deal with trade policy. 
If the CMEA were to deal on an equal footing with an organization 
that has powers it does not itself have, this would give the CMEA, ifnot 
supplementary powers, at least an international recognition that would 
not correspond to the juridical realities of its charter. -
The field of activity of EEC-CMEA relaiions 
The draft skeleton agreement proposed by the CMEA, like the Final 
Act signed at Helsinki, provided for bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments not only in trade and economic cooperation but also in matters of 
standardization, environmental protection, economic and statistical 
information, and long-term prospects. But, as we have seen, inter-
institutional trade relations clashed with the fundamentally different 
conceptions entertained by the two sides. This is why the Community 
agreed to discuss only problems such as the exchange of economic data 
and conjunctural forecasts, environmental questions, or transport ques-
tions, as well as ways to promote economic and commercial cooperation. 
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The creation of a joint commission 
The CMEA desires the creation of a joint commission that would 
examine bilateral trade agreements between the EEC and the individual 
CMEA member countries and would supervise the effective applica-
tion of the EEC-CMEA agreement. The EEC once again pointed out 
the impossibility of concluding an agreement of this type between the 
two institutions. As regards bilateral agreements, its reply was that no 
state external to the agreement may intervene to supervise bilateral 
relations. The EEC countries could only accept that the CMEA exer-
cise control through a commission on bilateral relations between the 
EEC and the socialist countries. For the EEC, to acknowledge such 
authority on the part of the CMEA over European East-West affairs 
would entail recognition of Soviet control over the CMEA countries. 
For the USSR, the EEC's refusal in this area is tantamount to a desire to 
divide the CMEA members to the benefit of ''ill-willed'' European 
interests. 2 
The most favored nation clause 
The CMEA, which would like to obtain a more privileged status , also 
called for inclusion of a most favored nation clause and a nondiscrirnin-
ation clause, as well as for the removal of quantitative restrictions, 
quotas, and other limitations on trade. The most favored nation clause 
would give the CMEA member countries the right to demand Commu-
nity concessions equivalent to those that the Community offers to other 
Western countries outside the EEC. The EEC refused to grant these in a 
blanket fashion, but it was willing to negotiate concessions with each of 
the member countries. 
In the face of these profound differences, the EEC proposed that the 
negotiations no longer take place at an official and political level, but 
among experts. The summit (decided in November 1979 at Moscow 
during the Haferkamp-Fadeev meeting) that was to have taken place in 
April 1980 was postponed in response to the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan, and talks were broken off for several months. 
Negotiations resumed in Geneva in July 1980. New discussions 
brought up the possibility of concluding a general blanket agreement 
between the two organizations and of agreeing on a more acceptable 
version of the skeleton agreement draft. The Community, desirous of 
getting out of the legal labyrinth, made some concessions. It proposed a 
new version of the preamble to the agreement that would underscore 
the importance of trade exchanges between the two parties . The EEC 
would be willing to study a narrower technical agreement bearing on 
the exchange of information between the two institutions in the more 
limited sectors of economic forecasting and statistics , and also in the 
areas of environment and standardization. For the CMEA, this meant 
minimizing the scope of the agreement. At the same time, the Commu-
nity did not alter its initial position, namely, that trade agreements 
could only be negotiated with the CMEA countries individually. It thus 
excluded all that had to do with trade and all economic relations from 
cooperation and from the scope of action of the agreement. 
The CMEA also did not budge from its positions. It once again 
called for conditions favorable to trade and economic cooperation, the 
most favored nation clause, and the abolition of discriminatory mea-
sures that blocked European imports from the Eastern countries for a 
number of products such as steel, laminated materials, textiles, shoes , 
glass, ready-to-wear clothing, electric motors, and farm products. 
The EEC refused to meet the CMEA demands, citing the lack of any 
guarantee and reciprocity of concessions. The EEC wished to apply the 
principle of' 'effective reciprocity,'' whereby a liberalization of Euro-
pean imports from the CMEA countries should be matched by a con-
crete undertaking of the Eastern countries to augment their imports 
from the EEC. 3 
The CMEA underscored the contradictions in the EEC's [external 
relations], which has maintained relations with the League of Arab 
Nations since 1974; signed the Lome Convention in 1975 with forty-
six African countries; signed agreements with Caribbean countries and 
with the Pacific nations (ACP); abolished in 1977 the last customs 
tariffs with the AELE; in 1979 signed an agreement with the fifty-seven 
ACP countries renewing the Lome convention, 4 as well as an accord 
with ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and is 
engaged in the preparation of a similar agreement with the countries of 
the Andean Pact. 
Finally, given the negligible progress made during these talks in 
Geneva in July 1980, the CMEA countries consented to sign an agree-
ment with the EEC without the direct participation of the countries 
affiliated with the Community. They accepted the principle that the 
CMEA and the EEC, within the confines of their powers, could con-
clude an agreement with any interested country that was a member of 
the other organization. 
The meeting that was to have taken place in January 1981 at Geneva 
was cancelled, the CMEA deeming that the EEC had not made enough 
concessions. 
In March 1981, the vice-president of the EEC Commission, W. Ha-
ferkamp, sent a letter of M. Lukanov, chairman of the Executive Com-
mittee of the CMEA, asking for some change in the CMEA's position. 
This letter was not answered. 
On June 23-24, 1981, the European Commission on Foreign Rela-
tions met at Brussels and approved the idea of a skeleton agreement 
which, although it would exclude control of the EEC's trade relations 
with each of the CMEA countries, would nonetheless help to facilitate 
East-West exchanges, which had become bogged down for economic 
and political reasons. Agreements such as the one concluded by the 
EEC in 1980 with Romania helped to give consideration to the specific 
needs of each member country of the CMEA, adapting to their diversi-
ty while responding to the complementary needs of the Community. A 
press communiqu6 of the European Parliament of June 29, 1981, men-
tions that the Commission of Foreign Relations adopted Mr. de Clercq' s 
report on the skeleton agreement and on specific problems of trade 
between the EEC and the CMEA countries, in particular, com-
pensation transactions for which it was necessary to establish a kind of 
code of conduct, and dumping practices, which needed to be combatted 
more efficiently. Finally, the report studied the harmful repercussions 
of the energy crisis on relations between the EEC and the CMEA 
countries. Increased cooperation in the energy sector was envisaged. 
The dialogue had been stopped dead in its tracks since 1980. Four 
years were to pass before negotiations were resumed. The signal was 
given at the June 1984 Moscow summit of party leaders of the CMEA 
member countries. One of the declarations of the economic confer-
ence5 confirms the ''willingness to conclude an appropriate agreement 
between the CMEA and the EEC and to contribute to the ongoing 
development of trade and economic relations that exist between the 
member countries of these organizations." This declaration was for-
mulated a few days before the NATO countries announced new trade 
restrictions on the Eastern countries, but it nevertheless demonstrated 
that the Soviet attitude toward European institutions had changed. The 
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Soviets had for a long time denied the existence of the EEC, and had 
even challenged the EEC representation at the Madrid conference, 
although they had de facto accepted a committee of representatives at 
the Helsinki conference and at the Belgrade conference. Today, even if 
they do not proclaim de jure their recognition of the European institu-
tion, they do accept it de facto. 
In early November 1984, the CMEA attempted to resume the dia-
logue between the CMEA and the EEC with a meeting at Brussels 
between Mr. Khristov, the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Trade, and 
W. Haferkamp, vice-chairman of the European Commission. 
On May 20, 1985, at Moscow, Gorbachev declared himself favor-
able to the establishment of relations between the EEC and the CMEA. 
"The CMEA is willing to find a common language with the EEC," he 
said during a talk with E. Cervetti, member of the leadership of the 
Italian Communist Party and chairman of the Communist Group in the 
European Parliament. ''The EEC should make itself open to trade with 
the East." The USSR was favorable to an "amelioration" ofrelations 
between the EEC and the CMEA, and Gorbachev declared: ''I would 
like to see the establishment of relations between them. " 6 
On May 25, 1985, at Warsaw, an important meeting took place 
between Bettino Craxi, the Italian prime minister, and General Jaru-
zelski. Italy at that time chaired the EEC . 
On May 30, 1985, receiving Craxi, Gorbachev said: "To the extent 
that the countries of the Community function as a political entity,'' the 
USSR is willing to "explore with them in a common language specific 
international problems.'' 
On June 14, 1985, the CMEA submitted an official request at Brus-
sels for expanded cooperation with the EEC during an interview be-
tween Craxi and Frarn;ois Mitterand. The Polish Ambassador to the 
EEC submitted a letter by V. Sychev, secretary general of the CMEA, 
to Jacques Delors, acting president of the Commission. 
Sychev proposed the establishment of direct relations between the 
EEC and the CMEA and suggested the adoption of a '' general declara-
tion" in the following terms 7 : 
In the complicated international situation in which we find ourselves, it 
is important to explore every possibility, to strengthen and to multiply all 
that is positive and that has been achieved in the development of pan-
European cooperation since the signing of the Final Act of the Conference 
on European Security and Cooperation ten years ago. The CMEA and the 
EEC, which play a major role in the system of global economic relations, 
could make a broad contribution to this effort. Considering what has 
preceded, and taking into account the contacts that took place in October 
1984 between the minister of foreign trade of the People's Republic of 
Bulgaria, Mr. K.hristov, and the chairman of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Conununity, Mr. Haferkamp, we deem it useful to begin joint talks 
between our two organizations as soon as possible . The purpose of these 
talks would be to sign documents of a general nature, e.g ., a joint declara-
tion providing for the establishment of official relations between the 
CMEA and the EEC that would take into account the powers of the two 
organizations. The CMEA is willing to present a draft declaration to the 
EEC . The aim of this new initiative would be to carry negotiations to a 
fruitful conclusion. The establishment of official relations could, in our 
opinion, promote the development of cooperation between the two organi-
zations and the member countries and would be a constructive step toward 
European and world cooperation, as well as a strengthening of peace. The 
CMEA is willing to designate a top-level delegation to conduct talks and 
proposes that they be opened at Moscow at a date convenient to the two 
parties. 8 
On June 18-19, 1985, the session of the EEC Council of Ministers 
decided to reply positively to this letter from the Executive Committee 
of the CMEA. The EEC supported the principle according to which 
negotiations should be undertaken within the spirit and as a continu-
ation of the Helsinki accords. 9 But the EEC requested time to study 
more carefully the proposals of the Eastern nations. 
On June 20-25, 1985 , Stefan Olszowski, Poland's minister of for-
eign affairs , met at Rome with Giulio Andreotti , acting president of the 
Community Council , and [Prime Minister] Craxi, who at that time 
was finishing his mandate as president of the EEC, to discuss relations 
between the two communities . "We are interested in intensifying trade 
relations between our two blocs ( . .. ). To do this we are willing to 
make concessions and to begin negotiations without any preliminary 
conditions,'' declared the Polish partner. 10 
On June 24-27 , 1985, at Warsaw, the fortieth session of the CMEA 
once again stressed the necessity of establishing official relations be-
tween the CMEA and the EEC . 11 Mr. Tikhonov, chairman of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Soviet Union, spoke for the USSR, and insisted 
on the necessity of establishing relations of equality between the two 
organizations in accordance with the spirit of Helsinki. "We are con-
vinced that such cooperation would be of mutual interest and would 
contribute to an improvement of the atmosphere in Europe and in the 
entire world." 12 
Before replying to the CMEA letter, the European Community un-
dertook a careful analysis of Sychev's proposals on July 29 at Brussels . 
It concluded that before thinking about resuming high-level talks , the 
CMEA should be requested to answer a number of questions . The 
committee asked by letter that it be given the draft of the joint declara-
tion . The EEC did not oppose the adoption of a declaration, which 
would be easier to negotiate than a true cooperation agreement, but 
before committing itself it would have to have a more precise idea of 
the parties involved, the meaning of " official relations" envisioned, 
and the areas which these relations would concern. Secondly, the Com-
mission asked the CMEA to confirm that a possible EEC-CMEA 
accord would. not prejudice the ability of the Eastern countries to 
conclude separate agreements with the Community. 
On the occasion of the summit at Helsinki on July 30-August l, 
1985 , in honor of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki 
accords , Mr. Shevarnadze, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, devot-
ed a large part of his talk to the desirable expansion of relations in 
Europe in economics and commerce: '' As regards cooperation between 
nations in commerce, economics , industry, science, technology, and 
environmental protection , we are a long way from utilizing the full 
potential of the Act. The socialist countries are favorable to the expan-
sion of this cooperation ( ... ) in relations between nations , and it is 
time to put an end to the practice of sanctions and embargoes of all 
types, discrimination, and arbitrary rejection of concluded arrange-
ments. In other words, the time has come to review carefully the entire 
range of problems in what we call the Second Basket" (on economic 
cooperation). 13 
On September 30, 1985, Sychev presented clarifications on current 
and future relations of the Ten with each of the countries of the East, 
and on the content of the draft of the envisaged declaration in a letter 
addressed to the European commissioner of foreign relations, Willy 
de Clercq and then to G. de Muyser, Luxembourg's ambassador in 
Moscow (at that time Luxembourg occupied the chairmanship of the 
Council) . The CMEA guaranteed that the conclusion of an accord 
would not be an obstacle to bilateral relations of the EEC with each of 
the Eastern countries. 
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On October 23, 1985, the spokesmen of the European Commission 
and the EEC Council of Ministers stated their skepticism with regard 
to the latest replies of the CMEA. Mr. de Clercq stressed that the 
establishment of such relations with the CMEA should not alter tangi-
bly the basic position of the CMEA. He once more stated the determi-
nation of the EEC to negotiate ''between partners and not between 
blocs. " 14 
On December 17, 1985, the ministers of foreign affairs of the twelve 
nations of the expanded European Community 15 stated at Brussels their 
support for a ''broad and deepened cooperation with all the countries 
of Eastern Europe.'' 16 After three months of reflection and hesitations, 
the EEC again studied for one last time at Brussels on January 9-10, 
1986, a letter prepared by de Clercq and addressed to the CMEA.17 
On January 31, 1986, the European Community finally agreed to 
establish official relations with the CMEA. The EEC Commission sent 
a letter in the name of the Twelve to CMEA Secretary General Sychev 
via the Romanian ambassador in Belgium. The EEC "confirms its 
readiness to resume the dialogue" it interrupted in 1980. It "shares 
with Mr. Sychev the goal of establishing official relations with his 
organization.'' 
At the same time, the EEC proposed in letters addressed to each of 
the seven European countries of the CMEA a "normalization of rela-
tions" with the EEC . The EEC confirmed that its relations with every 
East European country were top priority. The problem of West Berlin 
was not touched upon in these letters. 18 
On February 25, 1986, Sychev declared in Moscow that the estab-
lishment of "diversified" diplomatic relations between the EEC and 
the CMEA was a "mutual interest" and a "great step forward ." 19 
Finally, on May 2, 1986, the EEC announced the receipt of a letter 
from Sychev which de Clercq's spokesman referred to as "positive." 
Recent positions and interests 
of the parties involved 
The presentation of a schedule for negotiations made it possible to 
isolate institutional incompatibilities, and in particular, incompatibili-
ties in areas of competence that have impeded negotiations between the 
CMEA and the EEC. We shall now undertake to analyze the respective 
political and economic interests that explain the positions of each of the 
two parties and why talks could end with a joint declaration rather than 
an agreement on cooperation. 
For the USSR, the goals of negotiation are more political and strate-
gic than economic. The opening toward the EEC announced by the 
CMEA Secretariat seems to have been a turning point in the EEC-
CMEA dialogue. The Soviets, who until now had been reticent about 
recognizing a supernational organization such as the EEC, have now 
taken a radical turn. This abrupt change of attitude set in several weeks 
before Gorbachev's arrival in Paris in October 1985 and five months 
before the resumption of the Geneva negotiations on arms limitations. 
How is this new CMEA step to be interpreted?20 The CMEA seems to 
be desirous of establishing guidelines that would protect the member 
countries from a policy of economic sanctions to safeguard against any 
new Western trade restrictions on grain or technology exports . If the 
relations between the two "common markets" became more formal, it 
would be easier, the CMEA thinks, to oppose any restrictive decisions 
made by COCOM. 21 To this are added more economic reasons that are 
also important but that have w far not been decisive. 
The USSR and the member countries of the CMEA would like to 
find markets where they can sell their goods in larger quantities and 
under better conditions. At the commercial level, the EEC is the third 
largest provider of farm products to the USSR after the United States 
and Canada, and the USSR has already accepted a number of loans in 
ECUs [European currency units-Ed.]. 22 
By strengthening its ties with the EEC, the CMEA perhaps hopes to 
have an easier hand in its divisive tactics with regard to the Atlantic 
alliance, playing the EEC off against the United States. Is it a way to 
show the Americans that the USSR can obtain what it needs elsewhere? 
Indeed, the USSR has softened its tone vis-a-vis the EEC since Europe 
in 1981 opposed the American embargo on the sale of petroleum and 
gas technology. 
Probably, the USSR may also hope to discourage the various CMEA 
countries from going it alone in their relations with the West and to 
control them through the establishment a joint commission or some 
other community instrument. The USSR is indeed concerned about the 
tendencies, which T. Schreiber calls '' autonomist,' ' 23 of certain social-
ist countries that have been enticed by direct contacts with the EEC. 
Moreover, would not the USSR itself be interested in signing agree-
ments with the EEC that would give it, like the other signatory coun-
tries, a share in the market which, though perhaps minimal, would 
nevertheless be stable. 
For the other Eastern countries economic interests are most impor-
tant, but these are subject to political constraints. In contrast to the 
USSR, the small countries of Eastern Europe are more concerned with 
the trade policies of the Community. Much smaller than the USSR and 
geographically closer to the Community, they export a larger part of 
their production to the EEC than to the other Western countries. Their 
exports are essentially made up of farm products and low-technology 
manufactured articles, which come up against the communitarian pro-
tectionism deriving from the Common Agricultural Policy and Joint 
Trade Policy. 
So far only Romania has concluded, in January 1981, a blanket 
agreement on industrial and agricultural trade with the EEC, and the 
Romanians would like to extend it to other sectors. The other countries, 
with the exception of the USSR and the GDR, have negotiated arrange-
ments less restrictive than quotas and better price conditions for their 
exports, but at the cost of commitments that oblige them to self-impose 
reductions in their sales to the EEC countries of textiles and steel, yet 
without conceding de Jure recognition of the EEC. Besides, the Com-
munity has adopted some import quotas which in certain cases apply to 
Eastern Europe for products such as wheat, butter, pork, and horse-
meat. . . . For the East European countries that export such products, a 
due and proper agreement would guarantee them a specific volume of 
exports to the EEC. 
For the EEC, the stakes in an agreement with the CMEA are essen-
tially political. The EEC has always expressed its reluctance and even 
its opposition to negotiate in the commercial domain with the CMEA, 
wishing to avoid encouraging an affirmation of Soviet guardianship 
over the foreign trade of the Eastern countries. Although the EEC 
would not be favorable to a negotiation that would embrace trade 
relations, it has nonetheless made concessions by proposing to include 
in some future agreement with the CMEA a reference to the economic 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act. Nevertheless, it intends to main-
tain a priority on its bilateral relations with each of the CMEA member 
countries. This is what was stressed in the report by V. Bettiza which 
was discussed in the European Parliament. The question of bilateral 
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trade relations has always been the central point in the EEC's positions 
since the beginning of the dialogue. Trade relations in particular and 
economic relations in general cannot be regulated by a bloc-to-bloc 
agreement, since the CMEA has no powers in this domain and there is 
no joint CMEA trade policy. 
The text presented by Bettiza proposed strengthening the agreement 
that links the Community with Romania and exploring all possibilities 
for bilateral agreements with Hungary, Poland, and other interested 
countries. According to this report, the following must be done: 
-see to it that these countries adapt their products to the internation-
al market and do not content themselves solely with offering what they 
produce; 
-examine their solvency in trade contracts; 
-reinforce the special ties which exist between the EEC and the 
German Democratic Republic; 
-endeavor to favor contacts and information exchanges between the 
"two Europes," whose joint cultural legacy is immense. 
While Hungary has been the party to a keystone agreement in East-
West relations, the report also stresses the industrial progress of the 
GDR and its ''fidelity to Moscow, '' as well as the special condition of 
Czechoslovakia since .1968. It described "maintaining assistance to 
Poland.'' 24 But the EEC would not refuse prudent cooperation with the 
CMEA in well-defined areas. 
The EEC-CMEA dialogue has until quite recently come up against 
basic disagreements that prevented concrete measures and decisions 
from being reached. For years, neither of the two parties altered its 
initial positions. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it was quite 
clear that the two positions were not reconcilable. The talks were 
therefore interrupted in 1980 to put an end to this dialogue of the deaf. 
Divergences remained in the desire of the CMEA to include trade 
clauses in the agreement, and in the desire of the EEC to negotiate its 
bilateral agreements with each of the CMEA member countries . 
After four years of silence, the CMEA showed a perceptible desire 
to resume the dialogue, and, with the arrival of Gorbachev in the 
Kremlin in 1985, to reach a conclusion as well. The USSR seems to be 
willing to find a common language with the EEC on concrete problems . 
Is the dialogue now close to a true denouement? Can we today envisage 
any mutual recognition between the two groups, the establishment of 
formal relations, and the achievement of an agreement? 
Some positive points allow us a certain optimism, at least as regards 
mutual recognition. The Community experts th;nk that the term "po-
litical body" used by Gorbachev to define the EEC leaves room to 
believe that Moscow would be disposed to recognizing it. This point 
was confirmed in the letter from Sychev, CMEA secretary general , in 
his reference to recognition of the EEC as such that derives from the 
proposal to establish "official relations. " 25 This letter contains other 
satisfying elements: the talks would be limited to the adoption of a 
general EEC-CMEA declaration . The indication that agreements in 
the future would take into account differences in the ''powers of the two 
organizations'' would seem to mean that the CMEA would respect the 
position of the Community, which can only accept an agreement cover-
ing the domain of commerce. 
Finally, the reference to the ''member countries'' is also a satisfying 
element if it means that any EEC-CMEA agreement would not re-
place bilateral agreements. In any event, the fact that the CMEA 
replied so rapidly to the EEC questions was considered to be an effort 
to arrive at an agreement. Finally, the EEC intends to remain prudent. 
It would like to avoid a declaration that is devoid of real scope and 
could be exploited politically. It desires that a normalization of 
relations should end in an agreement that would truly take into account 
the powers and structures of the two organizations. As Willy de Clercq 
stated on October 23, 1985, before the European Parliament, 26 "Our 
basic objectives are to normalize relations of the Community with the 
member countries of the CMEA and to promote economic relations 
with each of the countries taking into account their situation and 
their special interests and consequently to avoid a 'bloc-to-bloc' 
approach.'' 
Notes 
I. Article II, paragraph 2, line (b) of the Charter of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance • 'L'integration economique a I 'Est: le CAEM,'' Notes et Etudes 
Documenraires, nos . 4268-4269-4270, March 8, 1976, p. 110. 
2. Agence de Presse Novosti, September 30, 1980. 
3. J. Zabza, "L'importance des rapports entre la CEE et le CAEM pour le 
developpement economique de I 'Europe," Commerce exterieur tchecoslovaque, July 
1982. 
4. Cf. C. Lennuier and R. Lignieres, Chronological Table, pp. 12-15, column 
"Relations exterieures de la CEE" in "La Corrununaute Economique Europeenne," 
2 vols . , Paris : Profi.l, Hatier, 1981-1982. · 
5. Declaration of the CMEA member countries "Le maintien de la paix et al 
cooperation economique internationale," Commerce exterieur de l'URSS, 1984, 
no. 7, p. 7. 
6. "Moscou favorable a l'etablissement de rapports CEE-COMECON," L'Echo 
de la bourse, June 21, 1985. 
7. Nonofficial translation of the letter published in Russian. 
8. D'apres EUROPE-"CEE/COMECON: la Corrunission europeenne est char-
gee d'explorer la portee de )'initiative du COMECON," July 21, 1985 . 
9. "Les relations du CAEM et de la CEE," BIKI (Bulletin d'informations com-
merciales etrangeres), July 25, 1985 (TASS). 
10. "CEE/COMECON: Jes Polonais veulent contraindre Rome a cooperer," La 
Tribune de l'Economie, July 21, 1985. 
11. "Le COMECON confirme: cooperation avec la CEE," B.M., Le Figaro, 
June 28, 1985. 
12. Les Nouvelles de Moscou, July 29, 1985; "Corrununique sur la 40eme session 
du CAEM, Pravda, June 29, 1985. 
13. "Le !Oeme anniversaire des Accords d'Helsinki," Le Monde, August 10, 
1985. 
14. Financial Times, October 24, 1985. 
15. The Ten plus Spain and Portugal. 
16. Le Soir, December 18, 1985. 
17. La Tribune de l'Economie, January 8, 1986. 
18. These letters have not yet been published. Information acquired from AFP, 
January 31 , 1986. 
19. L'Echo de la bourse, February 27, 1986. 
20. "Le COMECON confirme: cooperation avec la CEE," Le Figaro, June 28, 
1985 . 
21. Consultative Coordinating Committee of NATO for export control. Cf. "Le 
COCOM et les restrictions aux exportations de haute technologie vers les pays de 
!'Est" Le Courrier des Pays de /'Est, no. 301 (December 1985), pp. 52-70. 
2i. J. and C. Neme, "L'avenir de l'Ecu dans les relations CEE-Pays de I'Est," Le 
Courrier des Pays de I 'Est, no. 303 (February 1986), pp. 28-36. 
23. T. Schreiber, • 'Les relations entre le CAEM et la CEE,'' Le Courrier des Pays 
de /'Est, no. 296, (June 1985). 
24. Relations exterieures, no. 1169 (October 23, 1985). 
25. M. Paolini, "Le COMECON veut cooperer officiellement aved la CEE," La 
Tribune de l'Economie, July 18, 1985; "Europe," no. 4114 (new series), July 21, 
1985. . 
26. "Europe," no . 4191 (new series) (October 25 1985). Information a la presse, 
Brussels, October 24, 1985. 
35 
36 
Table 1 
CMEA Share1 In the Trade of EEC2 Countries In 1984 (In %) 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
FRG (excluding FRG-GDR trade) 
Denmark 
Great Britain 
Ireland 
Greece 
Notes: 
EEC (total) 
EEC exports 
2.9 
1.8 
3.2 
3.4 
1.2 
4.1 
1.9 
1.8 
0.5 
5.7 
1CMEA = USSR and the six European countries of the CMEA. 
2Excluding GDR, part G trade. 
Source: Calculations carried out on the basis of Table I. 
Table 2 
EEC imports 
4.5 
4.2 
3.3 
7.2 
5.1 
5.3 
4.9 
2.4 
1.4 
8 .4 
EEC Trade with the European CMEA Countries In 1984 (In millions of ECUs) 
Exports f.o.b. CMEA 
Imports c.a.f. (7 countries) Bulgaria Hungary Poland 
EEC Exports 21 ,217.0 1,190.4 2,159.5 2,380.4 
Imports 34,854.9 514.5 1,864.8 3,290.4 
Balance -13,637.9 675.9 294.7 -910.0 
Belgium- Exports 1,200.3 59.4 98.4 109.6 
Luxembourg Imports 2,969.9 23.3 42.5 154.1 
Balance -1,769.6 36.1 55.9 -44 .5 
France Exports 3,756.3 133.1 184.7 348.2 
Imports 4,338.8 69.3 197.3 416.4 
Balance -582.5 63.8 -12.6 -68.2 
Italy Exports 3,151 .6 176.3 260.7 256.4 
Imports 7,729.0 102.0 386.5 446.3 
Balance -4,577.4 74.3 -125.8 -189.9 
Netherlands Exports 1,078.7 54.2 141 .8 214 .9 
Imports 4,162.7 28.4 102.1 265.4 
Balance -3,084.0 25.8 39.7 -50.5 
FRG Exports 9,033.3 603.4 1,052.8 1,052.8 
Imports 10,218.6 192.6 916.2 1,227.3 
Balance 1,185.3 410.8 309.6 -174.5 
Denmark Exports 385.0 15.9 41 .8 80.8 
Imports 1,038.7 4.0 47.4 227.9 
Balance -653.7 11 .9 -5.6 -147.1 
Great Britain Exports 2,199.1 93.1 167.1 287.0 
Imports 3,195.1 31 .5 129.5 442.9 
Balance -996.0 61 .6 37.6 -155.9 
Ireland Exports 62.3 2.5 8.5 13.3 
Imports 166.8 0.9 3.6 69.2 
Balance -104.5 1.6 4.9 -55.9 
Greece Exports 350.3 52.5 30.6 17.4 
Imports 1,035.2 62.6 39.7 40.9 
Balance -684 .9 -10.1 -9.1 -23.5 
Source: Analytic Tables of Foreign Trade, Nimexe, 1984 (Z), Eurostat. 
Czecho-
GDR Romania slovakia USSR 
855.9 1,017.2 1,626.2 11 ,986.0 
1,636.1 3,003.6 2,115.3 22,429.9 
-780.2 -1,986.0 -489.1 -10,443.0 
92.2 60.5 73.1 707.0 
167.9 41 .4 69.3 2,471 .4 
-75.7 19.1 3.8 -1 ,764.4 
263.9 196.3 144.8 2,485.3 
330.7 351 .6 192.9 2,780.7 
-66.8 -155.3 -48.1 -295.4 
168.2 120.3 152.5 2,017.1 
145.5 1,235.9 274.7 5,138.0 
22.7 -1 .115.6 -122.2 -3,120.9 
115.2 58.0 106.0 388.5 
199.9 230.1 159.4 3,177.4 
-84 .7 -172.1 -53.4 -2,788.9 
398.2 941.8 4,810.6 
651 .5 1,053.4 6,177.3 
-253.3 -111 .6 -1,366.7 
43.4 7.7 44.2 151 .1 
229.0 25.7 86.6 418.0 
-185.6 -18.0 -42.4 -266.9 
151 .3 126.2 130.8 1,243.7 
434.6 386.9 211 .8 1,558.1 
-283.3 -260.7 -81 .0 -314.4 
3.5 1.9 4.2 28.3 
11 .8 6.8 13.1 61.4 
-8.3 -4.9 -8.9 -33.1 
18.2 48.4 28.8 154.4 
116.7 73.6 54.1 647.6 
-93.5 -25.2 -25.3 -493.2 
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Table 3 
Share of Each CMEA Country In EEC Trade' with the CMEA Countrles21n 1984 (In%) 
Czecho-
USSR Bulgaria Hungary Poland GDR Romania slovakia 
The Ten Exports 56.5 5.6 10.2 11 .2 4.0 4.8 7.7 
Imports 64.4 1.5 5.3 9.4 4.7 8.6 6.1 
of whom: 
Belgium-Luxembourg Exports 59.0 4.9 8.2 9.1 7.7 5.0 6.1 
Imports 83.2 0.8 1.4 5.2 5.7 1.4 2.3 
France Exports 66.2 3.5 4.9 9.3 7.0 5.2 3.9 
Imports 64.1 1.6 4.6 9.6 7.6 8.1 4.4 
Italy Exports 64.0 5.6 8.3 8.1 5.3 3.8 4.9 
Imports 66.5 1.3 5.0 5.8 1.9 16.0 3.5 
Netherlands Exports 36.0 5.0 13.2 19.9 10.7 5.4 9.8 
Imports 76.3 0.7 2.5 6.4 4.8 5.5 3.8 
FRG (excluding Exports 53.3 6.7 13.6 11 .6 4.4 10.4 
FRG-GDR trade) Imports 60.4 1.9 9.0 12.0 6.4 10.3 
Denmark Exports 39.2 4.1 10.9 21.0 11 .3 2.0 11 .5 
Imports 40.2 0.4 4.6 21 .9 22.1 2.5 8.3 
Great Britain Exports 56.6 4.2 7.6 13.1 6.9 5.7 5.9 
Imports 48.8 1.0 4.0 13.9 13.6 12.1 6.6 
Ireland Exports 45.5 4.0 13.7 21 .4 5.6 3.1 6.7 
Imports 36.8 0.5 2.2 41 .5 7.1 4.1 7.8 
Greece Exports 44.1 15.0 8.7 5.0 5.2 13.8 8.2 
Imports 62.6 6.1 3.8 3.9 11 .3 7.1 5.2 
Notes: 
'Excluding FRG-GDR trade. 
'CMEA: USSR + the six European countries of the CMEA. 
Source: Calculations carried out on the basis of Table I. 
Table 4 Share of Each EEC Country In EEC Trade, with the CMEA Countr1es21n 1984 (in%) 
CMEA Czecho-
(7 countries) USSR Bulgaria Hungary Poland GDR Romania slovakia 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Exports 5.6 5.9 5.0 4.6 4.6 10.8 5.9 4.5 
Imports 8.5 11 .0 4.5 2.3 4.7 10.3 1.4 3.3 
France 
Exports 17.7 20.7 11 .2 8.5 14.6 30.8 19.3 8.9 
Imports 12.4 12.4 13.5 10.6 12.6 20.2 11 .7 9.1 
Italy 
Exports 14.9 16.8 14.8 12.1 10.8 19.6 11 .8 9.4 
Imports 22.2 22.9 19.8 20.7 13.6 8.9 41 .1 13.0 
Netherlands 
Exports 5.1 3.2 4.6 6.6 9.0 13.5 5.7 6.5 
Imports 11 .9 14.2 5.5 5.5 8.1 12.2 7.7 7.5 
FRG 
Exports 42.6 40.2 50.7 56.8 44.2 39.1 57.9 
Imports 29.3 27.5 37.4 49.1 37.3 21 .7 49.8 
Denmark 
Exports 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.9 3.4 5.1 0.8 2.7 
Imports 3.0 1.9 0.8 2.6 6.9 14.0 0.9 4.1 
Great Britain 
Exports 10.4 10.4 7.8 7.7 12.1 17.7 12.4 8.0 
Imports 9.2 6.9 6.1 6.9 13.5 26.6 12.9 10.0 
Ireland 
Exports 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 
Imports 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 2.1 0.7 0.2 0.6 
Greece 
Exports 1.6 1.3 4.4 1.4 0.7 2.1 4.8 1.8 
Imports 3.0 2.9 12.2 2.1 1.2 7.1 2.4 2.6 
Notes: 
'Excluding FRG-GDR trade. 
2Thc USSR and six European countries of the CMEA. 
Source: Same as Table l. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This report summarises the proceedings of the first 
Wilton Park conference to be held outside the United 
Kingdom. The choice of Finland as the location for a 
conference on the future of Europe was based on two 
factors: first, neutral Finland is an established venue 
for the discussion of East-West issues, and secondly, 
Wilton Park enjoys the support of an enthusiastic Finnish 
Wilton Park Committee without which the conference at 
Haikko Manor, Porvoo, would not have been possible. 
The conference addressed the question: "are we 
finally seeing an end to the post-war era and the 
beginning of a new European modus vivendi?" It took 
place in June three weeks before the historic Communist 
Party Special XIX Conference which was a triumph for 
General-Secretary Gorbachev's radical reform of the Soviet 
system. The XIX Conference appeared to confirm the 
optimism of Wilton Park participants regarding East-West 
relations, although this optimism is dependent on the 
success of the Soviet reform process. 
The Porvoo conference agreed that open discussion 
between East and West could not have been achieved even 
two years ago. The climate of international relations has 
changed dramatically largely due to the "new political 
thinking" of a new post-war Soviet · generation, which 
favours democratisation in a land which previously knew 
only autocracy, and the tragedies of invasion and forced 
industrialisation. A wind of change is blowing aross 
Europe which leads some to talk of entering a "post-post 
war" era. Others argue that, al though the atmosphere of 
East-West relations has improved remarkably, the post-war 
era will not end until the centre-piece of the post-war 
settlement, a divided Germany, is re-unified or the 
question is resolved in some other way. 
II THE PROGRESS OF GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA IN THE 
SOVIET UNION 
Economic and political restructuring of the Soviet 
system, perestroika, was introduced to arrest the decline 
of the Soviet economy and society and the widening 
economic and technological gap between the Soviet Union 
and the West. Ossification of the Soviet political 
system, lack of incentive, economic inefficiency, 
drunkenness, inadequate supply of consumer goods and 
corruption of Party officials are symptoms of a system in 
need of radical reform. Faced with low or even negative 
economic growth, Gorbachev is attempting such far-reaching 
economic, social and political reforms that a redefinition 
of socialism is necessary. Gorbachev initiated his r8form 
programme with due reference to Lenin in order to reduce 
ideological - and political opposition . . Lenin's ·principle-s 
remain fundamental and sacrosanct in the Soviet system 
although new interpretations are being adopted. Stalinism 
has been condemned as a deviation from Leninist socialism, 
and Gorbachev claims to be reforming Stalinism and the 
ensuing stagnation of the Brezhnev years. Reform is thus 
equated with more, not less, socialism. 
Internal reform is also vital 
maintain its influence abroad. As 
XIX Conference: "In a Soviet Union 
and the Communist Party's role 
socialism might again have a model 
for the Soviet Union to 
Gorbachev stated at the 
where the economy works 
is cut down to size, 
to offer the world". 
Support for and Opposition to Gorbachev 
The Spring 1988 article in Sovetskaya Rossiya 
criticising the pace of reform was a tactical error by the 
conservatives and obliged Yegor Ligachev to deny his image 
as a conservative at the XIX Conference. There has been 
disagreement as to how deep the rivalry between Gorbachev 
and Ligachev actually is. Those maintaining that 
differences on ideology and over the pace and substance of 
reform are evidence of a disguised power-struggle appear 
to have been proved correct by Gorbachev' s removal of 
Ligachev from the number two position in the Politburo to 
the less important and more risky agriculture portfolio. 
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It is difficult to ascertain who supports Gorbachev. 
So far, he has successfully by-passed bureaucratic and 
conservative opposition in the Party with glasnost, a US 
presidential-style use of the media, the first Special 
Party Conference for forty years and the September 1988 
emergency meeting of the Central Committee Plenum. He 
cannot have the unqualified support of the bureaucracy and 
the military he is trying to trim, since both groups fear 
the loss of their jobs and privileges. However, Gorbachev 
knows .that the military, which has so far been exempted 
from the broader implications of perestroika, must be 
allocated enough resources to maintain the Soviet super-
power status of the Soviet Union . 
Support for Gorbachev appears to come mainfy from the 
intelligentsia, and even this may be withdrawn if results 
are not forthcoming. Faced with minimal support, 
Gorbachev's revolution 'from the top' intended glasnost to 
encourage public debate and hence build grass-roots 
support for perestroika. Glasnos t does not operate 
outside the constraints of the s oc iali s t sys t e m: there are 
no laws on the freedom of conscience, the press and 
unofficial associations. Before the XIX Conference the 
limits of glasnost excluded public criticism of the 
Politburo and the conduct of foreign affairs . The 
Conference took the limits of glasnost beyond what was 
expected, with unprecedented public condemnation of the 
intervention in Afghanistan and criticism of Politburo and 
senior Central Committee members. However, glasnost may 
still be lost oh a population still unaccustomed to 
freedom of expression. 
It has, however, been influential among the non-
Russian nationalities which resent Russian domination . 
The nationalities issue is the most sensitive 
unintentionally generated by glasnost; the demand of 
Nagorno-Karabakh to secede from Azerbaijan has been the 
most violent example. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership 
sees perestroika as an attempt to re-unify the peoples of 
the USSR. 
Soviet workers are now faced with heavier work 
demands, increased supervision, stricter quality control, 
and less job security, implied by the new Law on State 
Enterprise. Eighteen million people are expected to be 
made redundant by 1999. Substantial consumer price rises 
are in prospect and the political consequences of such 
rises in Poland are well known. Soviet citizens usually 
adopt a cautious view of reform proposals and good 
intentions of their leaders. Previous reforms in the USSR 
have failed, and economic reforms have come to be regarded 
as minor adjustments. In spite of a widespread acceptance 
of perestroika's critique of the shortcomings of the 
Soviet system, most citizens have a ves.ted interest in the 
status guo, preferring assured awfulness to the economic 
and political uncertainty created by perestroika. Already 
Gorbachev is having to defend perestroika from c r iticisms 
that it has made the economic situation worse. There is 
no focus of opposition to Gorbachev but fear and 
uncertainty may be enough to defeat perestroika. 
Economic Reform 
The reform process started with the elaboration of 
perestroika in 1986 and the problems of implementation are 
only now becoming visible. Perestroika acknowledges that 
central planning cannot meet the needs of the modern 
economy and aims to transfer economic decision-making away 
from bodies like Gosplan which failed to balance supply 
and demand for both raw materials and finished products. 
Many East European countries also recognise the need for 
fundamental economic change including the wide 
use of market mechanisms within the socialist economic 
system; Poland found that it was not enough t o modernise 
by importing modern technology and capital from the West 
without reforming the economic planning system. 
The economic blueprint and its details are vague. 
Some believe Gorbachev is tackling reform as well as can 
be expected. Others see perestroika as a disorderly 
trial-and-error process with reforms being implemented in 
the wrong order: industry before agriculture, acceleration 
before reconstruction, growth before quality. The 1988 
Law on State Enterprise couples the decentralisation of 
planning with encouragement of enterprise initiative and 
the elimination of subsidies to three-fifths of state 
enterprises. Results so far in sectors which have adopted 
f~ll e~onomic accountability, such as machine-building and 
light industry, have been disappointing. Many enterprises 
are still producing 100 per cent of their goods for state 
'?rders il;nd large distortions are occurring due to the 
interaction of heavily subsidised with unsubsidised 
enterprises. Ten per cent of state enterprises make 
losses totalling twelve billion Roubles a year, and are de 
facto insolvent, but they cannot close because there is~ 
bankruptcy law. The Law on Cooperatives has also not been 
fully thought through. 
However, economic reform involves more than 
structural reform. The Soviet Union is a huge market with 
pen~-up excess demand for consumer products, and the 
ultimate test of perestroika will be the improvement in 
the supply and quality of consumer goods. Price reform 
and currency convertibility are required but have not been 
~ur~ued because t~ey could be politically explosive. It 
is indeed uncertain whether fundamental price reform, or 
only price revision, is envisaged. 
The greatest challenge to perestroika has been its 
lack of implementation in spite of public debate and 
political decisions. Although both the majority of 
conservative delegates and the pro-reform minority rallied 
unanimously behind Gorbachev at the XIX Conference, will 
the bureaucrats implement their decisions? Results in the 
next two to three years will probably be crucial. 
VII HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS 
The movement towards international recognition of 
human rights emerged from the outrages of World War II. 
There are different philosophical and ideological 
foundations for human rights, and no single socialist or 
western concept defines their essence. There are, 
however, some universal and indivisible principles of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for 
all peoples and nations. A global approach to human 
rights is demanded, and there can be no agreement that, 
for example, Western Europe specialise in civil and 
political rights and Eastern Europe in socio-economic 
rights. 
In socialist countries human rights have been 
traditionally 'class oriented' with priority given to 
economic and social rights over civil and political 
rights. Laws already exist to protect human rights but 
legal procedures for their defence, and remedies for their 
violation, have been neglected. There has been insistence 
on non-interference from outside states and a reluctance 
to accept norms of international law in domestic law. The 
barring of international jurisdiction and procedures 
(inter-state complaints and individual communications) 
demonstrates a reluctance to accept international 
supervision of performance. 
However, there is a growing awareness in Eastern 
Europe of the need to alter the balance between public and 
individual interests. The need to extend individual 
freedoms, the importance of legal remedies for human 
rights violations, the equal importance of civil and 
political rights with economic and social rights are 
increasingly recognised. Eastern Europeans are also 
beginning to recognise that human rights have been 
internationalised and are not a matter exclusively for 
national jurisdiction, and may come to accept 
international codes and the role of non-governmental 
organisations to protect, promote and impleme~t human 
rights. Economic and social rights may cease to be given 
priority over political and civil rights. If these trends 
prevail, how would the nature of Eastern Europe's 
political systems be affected? It is important to note 
that the Soviet Union states that human rjghts can be only 
exercised within a socialist system which is it.self not 
negotiable. 
41 
42 
Changes are also evident in Western attitudes. 
western opinion may come to recognise that democracy and 
human rights can be safeguarded in a society governed by 
one party, provided guarantees are established, and 
measures are implemented to reduce the abuse of power 
inherent in a one-party state. Western Europeans usually 
accept the concept of socio-economic rights, but the US 
still rejects it. The West may also need to recognise 
collective rights alongside individual rights, and in so 
doing reject a strictly individualistic approach. It may 
also need to be recognised that State power is not the 
only menace to human rights; transnational corporations, 
for example, may also exercise too much power over 
individuals. However, Socialist bloc criticism of 
economic rights in the West is muted by lower levels of 
economic performance in the East: a job cannot be created 
at the stroke of a pen, whereas political and civil rights 
can be assured in this way . 
The realism of a global approach to human rights is 
still debated. Some argue that acceptance of the right of 
individuals to redress in international law is the acid 
test of states' adherence to human rights. They point 
out that the US view is inconsistent as i t emphasises its 
commitment to human rights but at the same time rejects 
international jurisdiction. Others note that East-West 
relations are almost exclusively inter-state because some 
states reject international controls and freedoms. 
International monitoring arrangements for human 
rights exist in the Council of Europe · and the European 
Community. Arrangements in Eastern Europe are informal 
and uninstitutionalised, and are strongly determined by 
the dominant political and ideological stance of the 
Soviet Union. In the future, a strengt hened CSCE and 
bloc-to-bloc Pan-European arrangements may be established. 
Admission of East European states to the Council of Europe 
is, at best, a long-term possibility. 
East-West co-operation over human rights is a long-
term task and its implementation requires a thorough 
re-examination and reconciliation of concepts and policies 
in East and West. The indivisibility and interdependence 
of all rights must be recognised, and the abuse of human 
rights for political purposes and propaganda must be 
abandoned. The links between respect for human rights, 
peace and development should be recognised in the foreign 
policies of East and West towards each other and towards 
developing countries. Double-standards and a selective 
approach, citing abuses in one region and not o thers, must 
be rejected. 
VIII EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Expansion of East-West economic relations cannot by 
itself promote improvements in the political climate. The 
widening East-West economic gap does not bode well for 
future co-operation, and it could become insurmountable by 
the year 2000. The East badly needs full normalisation of 
commercial and financial relations with the West and 
improved access to Western markets, technology, capital 
and management expertise. 
The 1970s were years of constructive East-West trade 
and co-operation but with detente in ruins in the late 
1970s economic relations declined. Better conditions for 
economic relations have re-emerged with the improvement in 
US-Soviet relations since 1985. Eastern Europe accounts 
for only one per cent of both OECD and US t rade but East-
West trade is much more important for the East. The Wes t 
imports principally raw materials, low technology 
manufactures and agricultural goods from the East. The 
Western export market for Eastern Bloc goods continues to 
be limited by the poor quality of Eastern manufactured 
goods. For example, Finland runs a large trade surplus 
with the Soviet Union, and has difficulty in divArsifying 
the composition of its imports from tha t country. A 
significant increase in East-West trade wou l d require the 
East to change from labour-intensive to capital and 
technology-intensive production. 
-In the 1970s, it was hoped that imports of high 
technology financed by Western credits would compensate 
for poor economic performance, but it is now clear that 
only substantial structural economic and industrial 
reforms, and a new foreign trade orientation, will 
increase the competitiveness of Eastern Europe's exports. 
There is little optimism in the West about the prospects 
for the success of Eastern bloc reforms . Western business 
will not be interested in opportunities unless extensive 
changes are implemented including: removal of bureaucratic 
obstacles, more freedom to remit profits, ending 
restrictions of Western equity in joint ventures to 
minority holdings, implementing price reforms, and 
devolving centralised decision-making to autonomous 
enterprises. While joint ventures are seen as an 
important means for improving economic performance, their 
promise is also limited by the strict conditions imposed 
by Western industrialists. More attractive economic 
conditions in other parts of the world reduce the 
attraction of the Socialist bloc. It remains to be seen 
whether special economic zones, which are operating 
successfully in China, will succeed in the Soviet Union . 
In addition, East European reform would have bee n better 
implemented before the Newly I nrlustr ia lis e d Countries 
(NICs) became major exporters. 
The West can support economic reform in the Eastern 
bloc through a variety of means; it could put Eastern 
Europe higher in the queue for trade preferences. East 
European and Soviet applications to the GATT and the IMF 
provide the West with opportunities for multilateral 
economic leverage to encourage reforms in pricing, 
economic policy and currency convertibi 1 i ty. The 
implementation of reform should also be a prerequisite to 
further lending to Eastern Europe. The East-West economic 
gap can only be closed by internal efforts and not by 
reliance on external borrowing as in the 1970s. 
East-West economic links are slowly improving. The 
German Democratic Republic retains its special access to 
the EC which provides a unique bridge in East-West 
economic relations. The Soviet Union finally recognised 
the EC in 1986, and the June 1988 CMEA-EC agreement helps 
to provide an umbrella for promoting bilateral trade 
relations. But issues of market access and quotas remain 
outstanding. The CMEA should ultimately aim at an 
agreement similar to EFTA's free trade agreement with the 
EC, and an all-European forum which could help to reduce 
systemic differences and promote trade. ~astern bloc 
economic growth also needs greater multilateral 
integration within the CMEA. 
In spite of much progress, Western policies often 
appear to be designed to hamper such a change. The 
Co-ordinating Cornrni t tee for Multilateral Export Controls 
(COCOM) 1.s a significant obstacle. The Committee 
restricts exports of militarily useful technology to the 
East on security grounds. However, COCOM is often accused 
of using security arguments as a cover for applying 
economic pressure. Western Europe and Japan have both 
complained that the COCOM list of prohibited exports is 
too long because it applies to many products with no 
military application. The US is accused of blocking 
progress in the CSCE by maintaining the length of the 
COCOM list. 
Eastern optimism regarding enlarged East-West trade, 
Western investment, an all-European division of labour in 
agriculture and industry, and industrial co-operation, is 
not shared by the West. Eastern Europe believes the EC 
should regard it as a natural trading partner due to its 
geographical proximity and other advantages. However, any 
suggestion of a 'Marshall Aid' plan for revitalising the 
economies of Eastern Europe is rejected by the Eastern 
bloc, and is received with little enthusiasm in the West. 
IX THE GERMAN QUESTION 
There is general agreement that the Ge rman Question 
remains central to the future shape of Europe, and that 
German re-unification is unlikely for the foreseeable 
future. However, there is also disagreement as to whether 
the desire for national unity is still strong in both 
Germanies. 
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The concept of a 'Common European Home• embracing 
both Eastern and Western Europe has been revived by 
Gorbachev. Relations between the two German states may 
become a bridge between the two parts of Europe. The 
Federal Republic regards a 'Common European Home• as a 
lasting solution to the German Question, although major 
stumbling blocks include the mutual recognition of the 
German parliaments, and the omission of the US, which 
rejects the concept. However, many in the West believe 
that if there is to be a common home, it wi ll be built by 
individuals, and not by states engaged in formal 
agreements to improve an adversarial relationship. 
X THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 
Many in the East and West agree that we ~re entering 
a more co-operative phase in European histo ry; the super-
powers have lost their predominance, the two blocs are no 
longer monolithic, and the military element in East-West 
relations is declining. The rigid zero-sum bipolarity of 
the post-War era is nearing an end. In these 
circumstances alternative views can exist about the 'end 
of the post-War era · : · 
the post-War era has already ended; 
the post-War era cannot be brought 
of the continuing division of 
reluctance of the super-powers 
settlement; 
to an end because 
Germany and the 
to make a new 
the post-War era could 
implemented plan for the 
power forces; 
end with an 
withdrawal of 
agreed and 
all super-
the post-War era will evolve and gradually fade away; 
the post-War era is a single continuum and by 
definition will end only when the next war begins! 
Glasnost is contributing to East-West confidence-
building. 'New thinking' in the Soviet Union, which 
appears to be more and more radical, is a disguised 
acceptance of changed power realities and security 
imperatives. New thinking brings four key changes: 
the use of ideology in foreign policy is largely 
eradicated and pragmatism prevails; 
the territorial imperatives of Soviet security have 
changed; 
security doctrines have changed from being based on 
military strength to an emphasis on finding political 
solutions; 
the leading role of the Party is now interpreted in 
the context of socialist pluralism, and the one-party 
state is therefore regarded as a transitional stage 
to a fuller democracy, though it is emphasised that 
the Soviet Union is not becoming a liberal 
democracy. 
Many argue that the success of Soviet reform is 
crucial to Europe's future; the perception of the Soviet 
threat has changed more rapidly in the past two years than 
in the previous forty years. Current reforms in the 
Eastern bloc provide the greatest opportunity to improve 
East-West relations since the Second World War. This is 
an opportunity which the West must nnt w~ ste, PvP n if ii 
cannot hope to influence the internal reform proces s 
beyond making welcoming statements and encouraging the 
growth of trade. 
Other Western reactions are more muted, seeing the 
developments in Eastern Europe as welcome but no reason 
for euphoria. Fundamental reform of the socialist system 
is not yet contemplated. Results of the 1 imi ted reform 
programmes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are 
uncertain, and serious setbacks are inevitable. 
Similarly, East European conservatives point out that the 
success of perestroika is uncertain and use Gorbachev • s 
Prague thesis of different national roads t o Socialism to 
support their own inaction. These negative responses are 
reinforced by the fact . that East European and Soviet 
nomenklaturas have a firm stake in the status guo and fear 
the erosion of their status and privileges. 
Arguably five possible options exist regarding 
Germany's future: 
a military crisis in Central Europe leading to a war 
in which no-one survives; 
a united socialist Germany, wh i ch is unrealistic; 
a united capitalist Germany, which is also 
unrealistic; 
a neutral German confederation, equally unrealistic; 
and a continuation of the modus vivendi, which is 
most likely. 
In principle, no nation can accept its own division. 
The Federal Republic considers the Democratic Republic as 
another state within the German nation, and the Federal 
Republic's Constitution envisages eventual re-unification. 
The Federal Republic believes acceptance of permanent 
division would provoke extreme left or right wing 
nationalist reactions in both states, and that such a 
renunciation on its part would not be c redible . 
In contrast, the Democratic Republic wishes to remain 
sovereign and will not accept being part of a re-unified 
German state . The Democratic Republic maintains that each 
German state must recognise the other, and that there must 
be mutual respect for the other's development . The 
Democratic Republic does not share the Federal Republic's 
'nationalism'. After 40 years the Democratic Republic is 
not a nation but a state whose German population are 
citizens of the Democratic Republic. The GDR stresses 
that Germany was unified for only 74 years during which 
the Reich played a damaging role in Europe; the status guo 
is not unbearable nor is there urgency for change. The 
Democratic Republic is content with equal political status 
with the Federal Republic, but it wants to narrow the 
economic gap. 
However, in spite of these diffe r e nces the. Federal 
Republic and the Democratic Republic have developed a 
modus vivendi based on the 1972 Treaty on Intra-German 
Relations, and pursue initiatives for increase d 
collaboration. The two German sta tes are on the 
front-line between the blocs and ~re bot h pa rticula r l y 
aware of the military and environme ntal t hreats i n Centra l 
Europe. The Jakes initiative, a joint declaration of the 
governments of Czechoslovakia and the Democratic Republic 
of Germany and the Federal Republic's Social Democratic 
Party, calls for a nuclear and chemical weapon-free zone 
in Central Europe. The Democratic Republic places great 
stress on the removal of nuclear weapons and accepts 
asymmetrical reductions as appropriate . The Honecker 
visit to the Federal Republic in 1987 indicated that 
peaceful cohabitation was possible. 
Events in Germany have strongly affected East-West 
relations. Any solution to the German pro blem must take 
into account not only the self-determination of the German 
people but also the legitimate geostrategic interests of 
all powers in the area. Neighbouring states in both East 
and West find the status guo in Germany politically 
convenient although they recognise the inherent problems. 
The Soviet Union opposes a unified Germany because of, past 
experiences and an unwillingness to accept a strong power 
in Central Europe. Re-unification would also imply the 
loss of the Soviet Union's strategic position in the 
Democratic Republic. France and Poland also oppose any 
move towards German re-unification . 
Current diplomatic efforts concentrate on the 
possible and seek to alleviate the consequences of 
division. The Federal Republic seeks practical improve-
ments which benefit the people in both German states. 
Borders should be made less impermeable through greater 
freedom of movement, and the extension of civil liberties . 
Already communications have been improved and there has 
been a dramatic expansion of cross-border travel and 
contacts, especially from East to West. However, in spite 
of these achievements the differences, belonging to 
opposing alliances and having different political and 
e~onomic systems, remain significant . 
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Changes in the West, particularly the progress of 
the EC's 1992 Programme, mean that East European countries 
will have to make a double adjustwent within the next ten 
years; adapting to perestroika in the Soviet Union, and 
gearing their economies to the EC market. The EC 
countries themselves will inevitably limit their concern 
with East-West economic issues as they struggle to adjust 
their own economies to the 1992 process. 
The European neutrals face other problems. They will 
have difficulty reconciling the lure of economic benefits 
of EC membership with the political requirements of 
neutrality. For example, Austria fears economic isolation 
and must either abandon some of its neutrality, or the EC 
must play down European Political Co-operation in order to 
entice it into membership. Ireland, whose treaty of 
accession excludes military security, may be a model for 
neutral states seeking EC membership. Although concerned 
not to be barred from the full advantages of the EC 
market, the neutrals are confident that their economies 
have much to offer, and that they can negotiate from 
strength. 
A Plan for the Future of Europe 
A speculative but comprehensive plan for a future 
realignment of the two converging European systems was 
presented to the conference; Soviet new thinking provides 
a dramatically new European environment in which 
speculation about possible futures is more justified than 
at any time since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The plan 
envisages the alliances retaining their commitments to 
treat any aggression against allies as threats to their 
own vital interests. However, the US would accept a 
diminution of its global role, and US troops would leave 
in an orderly fashion. A more integrated Western Europe 
after '1992' would be in a better position to assume its 
own defence. The Soviet Union would also redefine its 
security interests and allow reforms in Eastern Europe to 
develop without intervention by Soviet troops; these would 
be redeployed inside the Soviet Union. Poland and 
Czechoslovakia would cultivate a special relationship with 
the Soviet Union. 
An agreement on the German question could take the 
form of an 'Austrian' solution for the German Democratic 
Republic. It would retain its right to self-determination 
and its population would be free to decide their form of 
government. Neutrality should not be imposed, and the 
Democratic Republic should be free to remain a member of 
the Warsaw Pact. Both Germanies would renounce re-
unification and the building and use of nuclear weapons. 
The withdrawal of Soviet and American troops to their 
home countries would remove the driving force behind the 
costly conventional arms race in Europe. The Soviet Union 
would be able to transfer substantial ·resources to the 
civilian sector of its economy while retaining its 
super-power status with the majority of its nuclear 
arsenal intact. US public opinion would welcome a 
European settlement, not least because the US budget and 
trade deficits would be alleviated. 
The attempted implementation of such a plan would be 
dependent upon Gorbachev' s continuation in power and the 
speed with which new thinking is developing and being 
implemented in the Soviet Union. Al though Gorbachev' s 
position is not entirely secure, it was agreed he would 
probably remain in power. 
XI CONCLUSIONS 
The conference was in broad agreement that current 
events in the Soviet Union would determine the future 
shape of Europe, and that continued improvement in East-
West relations depends on the progress of perestroika. 
The principal conclusions expressed in the conference 
were: 
1. Both super-powers are now, more than ever before, 
concentrating on serious domestic problems. The 
soviet Union, faced with a deteriorating economy and 
resurgent nationalism, is aiming to reduce East-West 
tensions. A new US Administration, faced with trade 
and federal budget deficits, will re-assess its 
resources and expenditures. The US military will be 
a major target. for cuts, and al though US forces in 
Europe are likely to remain, there will be pressure 
on western Europe to carry a greater share of the 
defence burden. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Although Gorbachev has been successful in 
consolidating his power, the level of domestic 
support for him is difficult to assess. Although one 
should never place too much emphasis on the; 
importance of one man, reform would lose momentum if 
Gorbachev were removed. 
Through glasnost, the Soviet Union is moving towards 
'socialist pluralism'. However, there are limits to 
the reform of the Party-state; the Communist Party 
will not relinquish its control of the state and the 
Soviet Union will not become a liberal democracy. 
Resurgent nationalisms are the most important 
unintended by-products of glasnost. 
The Soviet Union does not want to open a 'second 
front' in Eastern Europe but it would be forced to 
intervene militarily should satellite Communist 
Parties lose control of economic and political order, 
or should a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact appear 
imminent. The priority must be to preserve Soviet 
security interests in its decaying empire, even 
though such an intervention would end perestroika. 
By improving confidence in East European-Soviet 
relations, and by recognising the acceptability of 
different paths to socialism, the faltering 
legitimacy of satellite r~gimes and Soviet security 
are being propped up. 
The West must welcome and encourage the Soviet reform 
process al though it may in the long run foster an 
economically stronger rival. Convergence of the 
Soviet Union's economic and political systems with 
those of the West would make it a more integrated and 
less threatening, even if less predictable, global 
actor. 
East and West disagree about how genuine is Soviet 
'new thinking'. The Soviet Union has initiated 
military withdrawals and adopted new negotiation 
positions on Third World trouble spots; accepted 
asymmetrical cuts and on-site inspection for the 
first time in the INF Treaty; withdrawn its 
insistence that an INF Treaty be linked to an 
agreement on SDI. But there has been no significant 
restructuring of Soviet forces in Europe; Soviet 
forces remain more than reasonably sufficient; 
military deployments still feature high-speed 
offensive capabilities; and defence spending has not 
been cut. 
Both East and West recognise that maximising the 
numbers of weapons held does not enhance security, 
and that arms control cannot bear the entire burden 
of East-West relations since it is not a substitute 
for overall co-operation. The economic problems of 
the two super-powers will provide an impetus for 
further arms control agreements. 
Although the ~ast appears to be more sanguine, 
Western businessmen are pessimistic about the 
prospects for trade and economic co-operation with 
Eastern Europe unless substantial economic reforms 
are implemented. East European governments would 
reject any • Marshall Plan' for economic assistance. 
Human rights will remain a barrier to the improvement 
of East-West relations. Inter alia I the denial of 
Eastern Europeans' rights to travel and emigrate has 
delayed progress in other CSCE 'baskets'. Eastern-
bloc governments insist that human rights can only be 
exercised within a socialist system the existence of 
which is not negotiable. 
The division of Germany will continue for the 
foreseeable future. The Democratic Republic's 
rejection of the Federal Republic's long-term goal of 
re-unification mirrors the fact that the German 
Question cannot be separated from the wider issues of 
East-West relations in Europe. 
The conference discounted the suggestion that 
glasnost and perestroika could destabilise both 
Communism and East-West relations, and expressed 
broad optimism that a continuation of reforms would 
contribute to further imorovement in East-West 
relations. However, it was recognised that if the 
Soviet reform process falters, or if events in 
Eastern Europe should lead to the Soviet Union 
intervening militarily, the resulting conservative or 
military backlash and the inevitable removal from 
power of Gorbachev would cause heightened tension and 
instability in East-West relations. 
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Wilton Park Papers published in 1988: 
1. Terrorism and the Media 
2. South and Southern Africa: Prospects for ending 
Apartheid and restoring regional Stability 
3. The Uruguay GA rnT Round: Freeing World Trade in 
manufacturing, agriculture, services and investment 
4. NATO after zero: Implications of Arms Control Agreements 
for Trans-Atlantic and Intra-European Relations 
5. National Defence Policies of the NATO Allies: Internal 
tensions and out-of-area problems 
6. Southern Europe in transition: Roles in NATO and inte-
gration into the European Community 
7. Middle Eastern dilemmas: US and European policies on 
oil, the Gulf War and the evolution of the Arab World 
8. Europe into the 1990s: An end to the post-war era? 
Dangers to democracy in Latin America 
China's open door: Relations with Asia, the US and Europe 
The impact of Soviet reforms on Eastern Europe 
India and the Sub-Continent 
Disadvantage and division in the Enterprise Culture 
Opcoming 1989 reports that will be received by the Library: 
Fighting the drug problem: National experiences and scope for 
international co-operation 
Public opinion and NATO 
Reform in the Soviet Union 
Progress of the 1992 Programme and Third Country implications 
The further agenda for Arms Control: Conventional and 
strategic balances 
The World debt problem: Banking and Government strategies 
The New US Administration 
South-East Asia: Economic and political development 
88A/ 1749 
88A/ 1748 
88A/1753 
88A/1741 
(on order) 
(on order) 
(on order) 
89A/311 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Population growth, desertification and famine 
The United States and its Southern neighbours 
N0rdic unity, neutrality and relations with the NATO and t he EC 
Israel 40 years on: Internal tensions and regional conflict 
The GATT Round and prospects for World Trade 
Japan, the US and Europe: Prospects for tripartite relations 
Socialist reforms and East-West relatfons 
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BULLETIN 
QUOTIDIEN EUROPE 
From the new Yalta to the Radical Party Congress in Budapest 
The evolution of some situati9ns .. and events may be so quick that certain 
"doctrines" may become obsolete before being fully formulated . It seems that this 
might be the case for the conclusions . ·reached by Dr. Kissinger concerning the key 
problems raised by relations with Eastern European countries within the framework of 
perestroika, which has spread to the Communist world as a whole . As we remarked 
earlier (see our Editorial of 23 February), these conclusions were hastily called by 
some observers the outline of a "new Yalta" to be neqot i ated between Moscow and 
Washington, the objective of which would be ·to "freeze" in some way relations between 
the two parts of Europe in order not to ;disrupt the process unfolding in the USSR 
(wh i eh has · inevitable repercussions in ·-tllllse countries), and not to cause tensions 
whose consequences might prove catastrophii . for all. Secretary of State James Baker 
recently torpedoed this plan with rather ·narsh words; but last week, addressing the 
Trilateral Commission meeting in Paris, Dr. Kissinger reacted and underlined mostly 
that what he advocates is precisely designed to avoid a situation whose only outcome 
would be a new Yalta. He further developap his arguments in an article to which we 
might return. The fact is that Kissinger .• if he is not the most "pro-European" of 
American politicians (and political scientists), is without a doubt aware of European 
re3l i ties and their more distant roots . . Hi~ vision might be overly influenced by the 
myth of the ba 1 a nee of powers or that · of ~he European concert (in fact a cacophony) 
born from the Treaty of Vienna, but its ml!irit ·is not to underestimate the complexity 
of certain problems and the added instabilfly that might result from a simple gesture . 
However, s i nee what is happening in certain of. these countries is not a semb 1 a nee of 
reform, but a real leap, the problem is Jh"it " you cannot leap slowly" and that "what 
we have to fear most is not the success but the failure of the leap" (Timothy Garton 
Ash in "The Independent" of 14 April 1989). 
The problem is thus an urgent one, but where are the structures capable of 
dealing with it rapidly and efficiently ? In theory, the organised part of Western 
Europe, name 1 y the Community, should be the most appropriate interlocutor. Del ors 
already said so in Rhodes in December and the matter was discussed again within the 
Council (this weekend in Granada). Mr. Oefors returned to this subject on 8 April 
before the Trilateral, recalling that the Community's objective is to favour peaceful 
change in these countries and to resist the temptation of destabilizing them, whi eh 
would result in a renewed cold war (this is what Kissinger fears). The Commission 
President be 1 i eves that " a 1 ong requested sign was given to Hungary, Po 1 and and 
Czechoslovakia", which turn to the Community "because we are not only relatively 
prosperous countries but a 1 so a Community of 1 aw where every member country has its 
say . Unfortunately, certain member countries interpret this "say" in such a manner 
that any rapidity, efficiency and coherence in action is impossible. 
In this difficult context, the r~placement of the European security system 
based on the military factor by a system ·~ased on consensus and mutual interests can 
only be achieved within the framework ~9f. a · political project based on popular 
consensus, as was the case for the creation of the Community . From this point of view, 
the fact that Hungary accepted to host the congress of a "European" party (the 
Radical Party) in Budapest (from 22 to 26 April}, is a historical event. 
When Hungarian philosopher Gaspar Miklos Damas states ("The Spectator") that 
"what is happening in Hungary is not a reform but a revolution", he is right: the 
Radical Party is a transnational and "revolutionary" party in the . most concrete sense 
of the word, since it "imposed" the recognition . of certain fundamental rights through 
popular mobilisation using referenda. Moreover, its concept of Europe is much more 
elevated than the tribal feud between rieo-liber~ls and neo-statists. 
The Budapest meeting is a po lit i ea 1 .fact whose importance is much greater than the 
contestation of. the Comecon or the dismantling of the electrified fences at the border 
with Austria ... 
Emanuele Gazzo 
DON'T MISS : 
*** In Granada : Strategy towards the East (Romania condemned) - pp . 3/4 
*** Monetary Union: Delors Report: FlexibiJity but start on 1 July 1990 - pp.6/7 
Vice Prbident Otl~ Emanuele Gazzo R6dacteur en. chef : Fardlnand·o Riccardi R•dacteura en chel adJolnt1 : Marina Gazzo 11 J1cqu11 Lout1ch 
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In publishing the fourth edition of COMECON FOREIGN TRADE 
DATA, The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies con-
tinues its by now firmly established series of pocket books of statisti-
cal data relevant to the foreign economic relations of the European 
member countries of the 'Council for Mutual Economic Assistance' 
- Bulgaria, CSSR, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR -
and, in addition, of Yugoslavia. The acronym "COMECON" is gen-
erally accepted in Western publications; "CMEA", however, is the 
official abbreviation of the (English) term. 
Generally, COMECON FOREIGN TRADE DATA presents informa -
tion selected from official statistics. After a short introductory Part O 
with comprehensive indicators of CMEA countries• foreign trade, 
data from official publications of the CMEA countries and Yugoslavia 
are used in Part I. Four of these countries (Bulgaria, GDR, Romania , 
USSR), however, do not report their trade with the West and with 
other regions of the world in a breakdown by commodity groups. 
Some of these gaps can be filled by reference to other statistical 
sources, and these were used in compiling Parts 11 and 111. 
For users from Western countries, Part 11 is probably the most rele-
vant. East-West trade, trade of the Industrialized West (15 countries) 
and trade of eight individual industrialized countries with the in-
dividual Eastern countries are shown in a breakdown by SITC one-
digit commodity groups. This part is based solely on Western sta -
tistics, collected by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, by 
OECD, and by Individual national Statistical Offices. Part 111 is based 
solely on UN statistics. 
Finally, Part IV, which is devoted to currency, balance of payments, 
and indebtedness, relies - with th.e exception of the official exchange 
rate quotations and the balances of payments as published by Hun -
gary, Poland , Romania and Yugoslavia - on estimates by Western 
scholars and institutions. 
It would not have been possible to produce this pocket book without 
the cooperation of other institutions. I. P. Sharp Associates provided 
most tables of Parts 11 and 111. We are most grateful to the WS R 
(Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Rechenzentrum, Wien) 
where the WI IW Data bank maintained by the V ienna Institute for 
Comparative Economic Studies is stored . An interested user may 
access the WIIW Databank directly at WSR or through I. P. Sharp 
Timesharing Services network. 
The camera -ready copy of the book was composer typeset by WI IW . 
The book was prepared and edited by the statistical department 
of the Institute. Please address comments and questions to Dipt . 
Ing . Havlik, WIIW, A-1103 Vienna . P. 0 . 8. 87. 
Gerhard F ink 
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Edited by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic 
Studies (Wiener lnstitut fur lnternationale Wirtschafts-
vergleiche) 
COMECON DATA 1987 
The h·ighly specialised:informatioll contained in this stafistical handbo~k 
reaches an interested public in its fifth updated edition. To the academic, 
political and economic analysts in need of measurable facts underlying 
the daily flood of controversial news' and vToWs that dominate the 
strained interplay of forces on the world political stage, the sober 
statistical data presented here will offer solid information in depth. 
The data originate from three distinct groups of sources: (i) official 
statistical yearbooks and periodicals published by the member-countries 
of COMECON and the statistical yearbook of the CMEA secretariat 
(supplemented by publications of Yugoslavia, an associate but not a 
member of that body); (ii) data published by international organisations-
the United Nations, ECE, OECD, IMF, the World Bank, etc.; (iii) Western 
sources. 
I 
Uniquely Comecon Data 1987 gives ready and systematic access to the 
data widely scattered in all those original sources published in a 
multitude of different languages. 
Comparability with previous editions-Comecon Data 1979, 1981, 1983 
and 1985-is preserved by the sequence and numbering of the table-
headings. Quick reference is facilitated through the detailed list of tables 
and alphabetical index. 
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